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Resumo 
A reacção do mercado de capitais ao anúncio dos resultados há muito que tem sido 
estudada pela literatura. O objectivo deste trabalho centra-se na reacção do mercado aos 
anúncios de resultados cujos valores sejam similares ou estejam acima das previsões dos 
analistas, proxy para a expectativa do mercado.  
Assim, depois de aferirmos a relevância e actualidade do conceito de concretizar ou 
superar as expectativas, sobretudo o efeito no valor da acção ao apresentar uma surpresa de 
resultados positiva, debruçamo-nos sobre os mecanismos utilizados pela gestão de forma a 
relatar resultados acima das expectativas. 
Seguidamente, e baseados numa abordagem sobre a linha do tempo das expectativas do 
mercado sobre os resultados, desenvolvemos as nossas hipóteses e definimos as nossas 
variáveis. Para reforçar a consistência dos nossos testes, consideramos duas métricas para 
calcular a rendibilidade anormal acumulada: o modelo de mercado e a rendibilidade 
ajustada ao mercado. Analisamos a existência de um prémio de mercado para as empresas 
que constituem o índice DJ Stoxx 50 E, que concretizam ou superam as expectativas. De 
seguida, através da análise da trajectória das expectativas, inferimos o uso de gestão das 
expectativas na amostra obtida, considerando 636 trimestres de empresas. 
Finalmente, analisamos a associação entre o prémio de mercado e a existência de 
manipulação de expectativas que se baseou em 48 observações nas quais existia a 
probabilidade de existência de manipulação de expectativas. 
Os resultados relativamente ao prémio de mercado são consistentes com estudos anteriores, 
e apesar de a nossa amostra ter um tamanho bastante reduzido relativamente aos estudos 
anteriores, apuramos a existência de um prémio de mercado para as empresas que 
concretizam ou superam as expectativas. Especificamente, obtivemos uma rendibilidade 
superior em 3,1% para as empresas que concretizam e superam as expectativas. Também 
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podemos concluir que a magnitude da surpresa dos resultados influencia a rendibilidade 
anormal da empresa. 
No que respeita à presença de gestão de expectativas verificamos que existe uma diferença 
significativa entre casos onde é provável a existência de gestão de expectativas e os casos 
onde é menos provável que exista gestão de expectativas. Deste modo, podemos afirmar 
que existe gestão de expectativas nas empresas e no período da amostra. 
No que concerne à associação entre a gestão das expectativas e o prémio de mercado, os 
resultados mostram evidência empírica de que o prémio de mercado existe quando as 
empresas superam ou concretizam as expectativas através da gestão das expectativas. No 
entanto, não foi possível concluir se o prémio é significativamente diferente para os casos 
em que o MBE é genuíno do que para os casos em que a gestão das expectativas influencia 
o facto de as empresas concretizarem ou superarem as expectativas. 
Palavras-chave: Gestão das expectativas; Gestão dos resultados; Previsões dos analistas; 
Surpresa nos resultados; Concretizar ou superar as expectativas. 
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Abstract 
The capital market reaction to the earnings announcement has been studied in the 
literature. This work focuses on market reaction to earnings announcement, whose values 
are similar or above analysts' forecasts, proxy for market expectations. 
Consequently, after assess the relevance and timeliness of the concept to meet or beat 
expectations, especially the value-effect in which we present a positive earnings surprise, 
we have looked at the mechanisms used by management in order to report earnings above 
expectations. 
Subsequently, and based on an approach of the earnings expectations time line, we develop 
our hypotheses and design our variables. To enhance the consistency of our tests, we 
consider two metrics to calculate the cumulative abnormal returns: the market model and 
market adjusted return. We analyze the existence of a market premium for firms of the DJ 
Stoxx 50 E, which meet or beat expectations. Then, and analyzing expectations path, we 
infer expectations management in the sample obtained in 636 firms-quarters. 
Finally, we analyzed the association between the market premium and the existence of 
expectations management, based on 48 observations in which there was the likelihood of 
manipulation of expectations. 
The results for the market premium are consistent with previous studies, and although our 
sample has a very small size in relation to previous studies, establish the existence of a 
market premium for companies that meet or beat expectations. Specifically, we obtained a 
higher return at 3.1% for firms that realize and exceed expectations. We can also conclude 
that the earnings surprise magnitude affects the return of the company. 
Regarding the presence of expectations management, we detect that there is a significant 
difference between cases likely to exist expectations management and cases where it is less 
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likely that there is expectation management. Thus, we can say that there is expectation 
management in firms and sample period. 
Concerning the association between the expectations management and the market 
premium, the results show empirical evidence that the market premium exists when 
companies meet or beat expectations through expectations management. However, we 
could not conclude if the premium is significantly different for cases in which the MBE is 
genuine from those cases where the expectations management influences the fact that 
companies meet or beat expectations. 
Key Words: Expectations management; Earnings management; Analysts’ forecasts; 
Earnings surprise; Meet or beat expectations. 
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Chapter 1  Introduction 
Chapter 1 
Introduction  
Prior literature suggests that earnings benchmarks play an important role in capital 
markets. Moreover, recent evidence shows that analysts’ forecast as became an important 
earnings benchmark and a reasonable proxy to market expectations. Furthermore, capital 
market participants watch carefully the earnings release and investors reward firms that 
meet or beat analysts’ forecasts. In contrast, report earnings that fail the market 
expectations are costly to the firms. 
Accounting and finance literature survey capital market reaction to earnings 
announcements, particularly the capital market reaction to earnings that meet or beat 
expectations (hereafter MBE). However, a market reaction to the earnings release is 
inconsistent with the market efficiency hypothesis, and, unless the earnings are surprising 
there should be no market reaction to earnings announcement. Nevertheless, empirical 
evidence shows that there is a positive market reaction to positive earnings surprise1
Managers recognize the value-relevance of reporting earnings above market expectations. 
Subsequently, further evidence suggests that they are not merely observes in “expectations 
game”. Rather, they endeavor to report earnings that meet or beat expectations, managing 
reported earnings or guiding market expectations. Prior literature refers to manager’s 
earnings management and expectations management as an effort to meet or beat earnings 
benchmarks, as the Financial Numbers Game (hereafter FNG). The motivations regularly 
. 
                                                 
1 The concept of positive earnings surprise is consistent with cases of MBE.  
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suggested for such actions are the maximization of the share price, the enhanced of 
management credibility with shareholders and creditors and the prevention of litigation 
costs associated with an unfavorable earnings surprise. Managers often use inside 
information to misinform the market about firms’ future performance and lead to a positive 
reaction surround the earnings release. This managers’ action is only possible due the 
information asymmetry between them and investors. 
Alternatively, earnings analysts’ forecasts had gain importance as earnings benchmarks, in 
the academic and practical field. Empirical literature documented a higher accuracy in 
analysts’ forecasts relatively to other metrics such as earnings time-series. On the other 
hand, it is documented that analysts’ coverage increased in recent years, leading to more 
comprehensive and accurate forecasts. The evidence on the efficacy of analysts’ forecasts 
reveals that they are used by investors and, moreover, can perform as a reasonable proxy to 
the unobservable market expectations. 
Additionally, empirical evidence suggests a decrease on the managers’ effort to achieve 
market expectations through earnings management. In fact, after the financial scandal in 
the beginning of the last decade, firms seem to apply expectations downward guidance 
instead of manipulating accounting numbers. 
Although, the remarkable importance and relevance of the analysts forecasts and the 
market reaction to firms that report earnings meeting or beating market expectations, in a 
European context the study on this issue are scarce. In particular, no empirical study relies 
in a specific index and market. 
In summary, due the relevance and actuality of the phenomena of MBE allied to the 
stringency on the subject in European companies, we focused at capital market reaction to 
the earnings surprise, along with the existence of firms’ expectations management to MBE. 
Specifically, we focused on the incentives given by the capital market, in particular the 
increase of price shares in the days surrounding the earnings announcement using a sample 
of firms of the DJ Stoxx 50 Euro. 
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As documented in previous research, managing earnings upward or guiding analysts’ 
forecast downward are the two forms to managers avoid a negative earnings surprise. Our 
purpose is to test the existence of expectations management and their impact in the market 
premium to MBE, in a European context. 
Our research is related to Bartov et al. (2002) model and we assess expectations 
management concerning the earnings information paths over the quarter. As a result, the 
work has as its main objectives: 
 Test whether there is, in companies that comprise the DJ Stoxx 50 Euro, any market 
reward to firms that meet or beat expectations, after controlling for the magnitude 
of the earnings forecasts errors; 
 Identify the expectations management through the paths of earnings information; 
 Analyze if investors assign any reward to firms that meet or beat analysts’ 
forecasts, even when they manage analysts forecasts downward, (i.e., management 
expectations); 
 Test if the market premium differs in cases in which MBE is genuine, from those 
that are achieved with the use of expectations management. 
To fulfill the above stated objectives, this dissertation is organized as follows. 
After this brief introductory chapter, Chapter 2 provides same general theoretical 
background on the financial numbers game, in particular, in the meeting or beating 
analysts’ forecasts and their implications in the capital market. We also outline the 
evidence of the two mechanisms used by managers to achieve the MBE, expectations and 
earnings management, focusing on the expectations management. The chapter provides 
same support to embody the empirical research. Finally, we outline some of the relevant 
studies on the MBE and the main research questions that they address.  
Chapter 3 presents the research design. Specifically, we denote the purpose of the study 
and the hypotheses that we propose to test. To that matter we develop the timeline of 
earnings information and the events needed to perform the empirical work, as long as the 
expectations paths arising from the earnings information. After that, we formalize the 
4  Financial Numbers Game - Evidence To The DJ Stoxx 50 Euro Index  
 
 
hypotheses to test and present our sample. Finally, we develop our methods and tests based 
on an event study approach. 
Chapter 4 is devoted to expose empirical results and their subsequent analysis. We begin to 
present the results of the market premium tests, focusing on the regression approach. After 
that, we denote our results on the presence of expectations management, looking at the 
expectations paths. Finally, we present empirical results on the association between the 
market premium and the managers’ intervention through expectations guidance. 
Chapter 5 conclude this dissertation summarizing the main empirical achievements in this 
work, pointing same limitations and outline same future work directions as a continuation 
of this research. 
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Chapter 2  Theoretical Background 
Chapter 2 
Theoretical Background 
2.1 Introduction 
In this chapter we outline same accounting and financial literature essential to the 
foundations of our empirical work. Accordingly, we begin with the definition of our 
investigation framework. Specifically, we delineate the concerns about Financial Numbers 
Game, clarifying the participants, incentives and formal rehearsals. 
In order to taper our investigation problem we bordered the magnitude of the meet or beat 
expectations phenomena, as long as the strategies used to achieve the expectations, 
earnings and expectations management. In particular, we exploit the disclosure 
environment, the use of analysts’ forecasts as a proxy to the market expectations and the 
strategy of expectations management as a tactic used by firms to meet or beat analysts’ 
forecasts.  
Finally, we summarize same of the relevant empirical work on MBE, screening different 
approaches to test the existence of MBE and their implications, focusing on the capital 
market reaction to the MBE. 
2.2 Investigation problem 
2.2.1 Financial numbers game 
The reaction of the capital markets to the firm’s financial and business information has 
gain a growing importance in the last decades. In 1998, Arthur Levitt, a former Chairman 
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of Securities Exchange Commission (SEC), raised the question about earnings and 
expectations management taking place in North American firms: 
“…through conference calls or embargoed press releases, analysts and institutional 
investors often hear about material news before it made. In the interval, there is a great 
deal of unusual trading… This is the pattern earnings management creates: companies try 
to meet or beat Wall Street earnings projections… their ability to do so depend on 
achieving earnings expectations of analysts. And analysts seek constant guidance from 
companies to frame those expectations.” 
Executives realize the importance of capital markets reaction and try to report earnings that 
corrugate with market expectations. Further it is well documented that missing earnings 
expectations is costly to the companies. Skinner and Sloan (2002) found that the stock 
market reaction to negative earnings surprises tends to be large and asymmetric, 
particularly for growth stocks, suggesting a high cost to missing analysts' expectations. 
Prior literature refers to the Chief Executive Officers’ (CEOs) perception of market 
reaction and the strategies they used to influence market participants behavior, as financial 
numbers game. The game is a phenomenon in which firms engage in management of 
earnings and expectations to meet or beat earnings benchmarks. The game could have 
different forms and names depending on the tactics applied to change firm’s image.  
Beaver (1968) studied the common stock investors’ reaction and how they perceive value 
surround the earnings announcement date, analyzing the price movements and the 
transaction volume of the common stock. Results suggest that the earnings announcement 
gives an important signal to the market, and managers realize that positive earnings are an 
important benchmark to achieve. Degeorge et al. (1999) identified a hierarchy of earnings 
benchmarks and posited that managers seek, (i) reporting positive earnings, (ii) sustaining 
recent performance and (iii) meeting or beating analysts’ forecasts. More recently, Brown 
et al. (2005) have shown that since the mid 90’s Degeorge’s hierarchy is no longer valid 
and investors penalized firms for reporting quarterly earnings missing analyst’s estimates 
more than they do for missing the other two benchmarks. Degeorge et al. (2005) extended 
the prior study and found that higher growth expectations are associated to a higher 
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tendency to exactly meet or beat the analyst forecast and this phenomenon has been more 
prevalent since 1996. Therefore, managers are aware of the importance of reporting results 
that exceed expectations and will translate it into a premium market. Recent literature 
suggests that companies have an active role in the game by altering reported earnings or 
managing expectations (see for example, Vickers (1999); McGee (1997); Lacina and 
Karim (2004)). 
The stock price reflects the market expectations about the future company performance. 
Therefore, a negative earnings surprise gives an important signal to the market, decreasing 
expectations and causing subsequent devaluation. This issue was early focused in the 30´s 
by Dodd and Graham (1934: 552):  
“The effect of announcement of earnings on value is likely to be insignificant, unless 
earnings announcement itself signals a change in the outlook of the future…. Since the past 
cannot be changed, it is not an issue in the purchase decision in the future of earnings that 
the investors will obtain by buying stocks. It is the ability of the existing assets and 
liabilities to create future earnings that determine the value of the equity position.” 
Consequently, unless the result is a surprise it should not be expected any market reaction 
to the earnings announcement. This line of thought can raise the pertinent question 
regarding the efficiency of markets. A prominent earlier work on capital markets provided 
by Ball and Brown (1968:160) state that capital market efficiency offers “justification for 
selecting the behavior of security prices as an operational test of usefulness” of information 
in financial statements. 
 The Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH) is an important concept, and it has become 
increasingly widely accepted since interest in it was reborn in the late 1950’s and early 
1960’s under the rubric of the “theory of random walks” in the finance literature and 
“rational expectations theory” in the mainstream economics literature. The random walks 
theory suggests that earnings are close to a random walk and the growth rate is predictable 
only one or two years in the future as cited by La Porta et al. (1997). Fama (1965:3) noted 
that this theory says that the “future path of the price level of a security is no more 
predictable than the path of a series of cumulated random numbers”. However, the ideal is 
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a market in which prices provide accurate signals for resource allocation, i.e., the stock 
price at any time fully reflect all available information, Fama (1970).  
The semi-strong form of market efficiency posits that investors should not be able to trade 
profitably on the basis of publicly available information, such as analyst estimates, Barber 
et al. (2001). On the other hand, research departments of brokerage houses spend large 
sums of money on security analysis, presumably because these firms and their clients 
believe its use can generate superior returns. Conversely, managers have private 
information and use this advantage to alter the market participants’ perception about firms’ 
financial numbers, this way engaging in voluntary disclosures to downward expectations 
about firm’s future performance to ensure that reported earnings exceed these expectations. 
Thus, because of inefficient markets and information asymmetry between investors, 
analysts and managers, further evidence suggests that there is a game played by companies 
in order to change the expectations about future performance and reward the future growth 
in the days that surround the earnings announcement date2
This is one of the images that the game could have, expectations manipulation, but firms 
engage in some activities of accounting manipulations to achieve earnings benchmarks. 
Accordingly, firms use the flexibility in accounting principles and “manufacture” earnings 
that meet these benchmarks. In Table 1 we present a resume of the labels that FNG could 
have when firms engage in earnings manipulation, Mulford and Comiskey (2002:3). 
. 
As mentioned in the introduction of this dissertation, the main objective of this work is to 
provide evidence of the expectations management. So, although the earnings management 
is an extremely important subject we will focus our study only on managers' voluntary 
disclosures in order to manipulate earnings expectations and meet or beat expectations. 
 
                                                 
2 Brown et al. (2005) and Koh et al. (2008) suggest that the reported earnings “game” between analysts, 
investors, and firms has evolved over time and the frequency of meeting or beating expectations increased in 
the last decade. 
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Table 1 - Common labels for the financial numbers game 
Name Definition 
Aggressive accounting A forceful and intentional choice and application of 
accounting principles done in an effort to achieve 
desired results. 
Earnings management The active manipulation of earnings toward a 
predetermined target. 
Income smoothing A form of earnings management designed to remove 
peaks and valleys from a normal earnings series, 
including steps to reduce and store profits during 
good years for use in bad years. 
Fraudulent financial reports Intentional misstatements or omissions of amounts 
or disclosures in financial statements, done to 
deceive financial statement users, that are 
determined to be fraudulent by an administrative, 
civil, or criminal proceeding 
Creative accounting practices Any and all steps used to play the FNG, including 
the aggressive choice and application of accounting 
principles, fraudulent financial reporting, and any 
steps taken toward earnings management 
Source: adapted from Mulford and Comiskey (2002: 3) 
2.2.2 Rewards of the game 
The game is played by those who expect that there will be a reward. The reward can be the 
increased demand of the shares and their subsequent valorization. For others, the objective 
is to improve debt ratings, to reduce the amount of interest and diminish the constraint to 
increased debt. When CEOs are paid with bonus-option plans they have an increased 
motivation to meet or beat expectations. Finally, we can observe another motivation, 
mainly in high-profile firms, that will be the reduction of political costs, including avoiding 
more regulation or higher taxes.  
The expectations or earnings management could affect managers’ reputation and could 
trigger into law suits. Therefore they must recognize that will be a compensation in this 
actions. In this chapter we will point same incentives (see Table 2) focused on accounting 
literature. 
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Table 2 - Rewards of the game 
Category Rewards Surveys 
Market  Higher shares prices 
Reduced share price volatility 
Increased corporate valuation 
Lower the cost of capital 
Increased value of stock options 
Sadique et al.(2008); Bartov et 
al. (2002); Dopuch et al. (2008); 
Venkatachalam and Wang 
(2000) 
 
Borrowing cost effects Improved credit quality 
Higher debt rating 
Lower borrowing costs 
Less stringent financial covenants 
Jiang 2008; Melgarejo (2010); 
Crabtree and Maher (2005) 
Bonus plan effects Increased profit-based bonuses Bauman et al.( 2005); Bauman 
and Shaw (2006); Healy (1985); 
Watts and Zimmerman (1978); 
Matsunaga and Park (2001); 
Bolliger and Kast (2004) 
 
Political cost effects Decreased regulation 
Avoidance of higher taxes 
Moses (1987); Hagerman and 
Zmijewski (1979); Morse and 
Richardson (1983); Mergenthaler 
Jr et al(2010) 
Source: Adapted from Mulford and Comiskey (2002:4)  
Contractual incentives  
FNG rewards, specifically, contractual incentives, implies that we recognize that firms is a 
set of contracts. Fama and Jensen (1983: 302) define organization as:  
“… the nexus of contracts, written and unwritten, among owners of factors of production 
and customers. These contracts or internal "rules of the game" specify the rights of each 
agent in the organization, performance criteria on which agents are evaluated, and the 
payoff functions they face.”  
This image of the firm leads us to the agency theory which presents the firm as a set of 
contracts and defend that the financial information plays an important role to relieve the 
conflicts between the several agents (Watts and Zimmerman, 1978). Jensen and Meckling 
(1976: 309) defined agency relationship as: 
“…as a contract under which one or more persons (the principal(s)) engage another 
person (the agent) to perform some service on their behalf which involves delegating some 
decision making authority to the agent”.  
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As the agent has the power to make decisions for the principal he may be tempted to 
pursue their own interests rather than trying to maximize the principal value (so-called 
conflicts of interests). Therefore, the remuneration contracts and the debt agreements may 
induce the managers into earnings or expectations manipulation to increase remuneration, 
improve job insurance and mitigate the potential contractual breaches with the debt 
owners.    
Due the conflict of interests between managers (control) and shareholders (property), 
bonus-plan compensation is often defined.  This bonus-based compensation is indexed to 
performance measures, i.e., balance spreadsheet results and/or stock price. When 
managers’ remuneration is associated with accounting measures, they have increasing 
incentives to manipulate earnings based on the accruals. On the other hand, if managers’ 
remuneration is based on stock price, they had a higher incentive to meet or beat 
expectations. Healy (1985) argued that accounting choices should be studied along with 
the managers’ compensation plans.  
A substantial body of theoretical works shows that stock-based compensation plays an 
important role in aligning the managers’ incentives with shareholders and reducing agency 
costs3
                                                 
3 For representative surveys and discussion on executive compensation with emphasis on equity-based 
compensation, see Bushman and Smith (2001); Brickley et al. (1985); Core et al.( 2003). 
. Equity incentives and stock-based compensation became more usual in contracts 
between executives and shareholders, as especially since the 1990s (Murphy, 1999). Due 
to the significant equity based holdings, managers’ wealth becomes sensitive to their firm’s 
stock prices. From a perspective of risk diversification managers will be motivated to sell 
stocks of their firms. That gives them a plus ground to increase short-term stock price by 
manipulating earnings or expectations. Matsunaga and Park (2001) showed empirical 
evidence that CEOs’ bonus payments provide them with economic incentives to meet 
market expectations and to achieve earnings from the same quarter of the previous year. 
However, the authors did not find any evidence of a relationship between CEOs’ bonus 
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payments and loss quarters4
A different perspective is related to the restrictions in lending contracts. There is a dearth 
of research on managerial propensities to engage in benchmark beating behavior to affect 
the cost of debt. When there is a violation of the clauses of the financing contract, the 
company incurs costs that can take the form of higher interest rates or demand immediate 
debt. Therefore managers had a strong incentive to manipulate earnings
. Besides earnings management, which has had a strong focus 
in literature, a widespread way to meet analysts forecast is to provide analysts with 
pessimists’ disclosures (the so-called downward guidance). Bolliger and Kast (2004) gave 
an important contribution on executive compensation making the link between 
expectations management and executive compensation. They documented a strong 
connection between expectations management and relevant components of CEO option 
compensation, such as bonus plan payments and the value of firm’s shares (owned by 
CEOs). Rogers and Stocken (2003) found that when managers are more likely to face 
litigation, release less optimistic forecasts than managers less likely to face litigation, and 
this incentive is dampened when it is more difficult to detect whether managers have 
misrepresented their forward-looking information. 
5
Political costs incentives 
. Jiang (2008) 
finds that firms beating earnings benchmarks have: (i) better one-year ahead credit ratings; 
and (ii) a smaller initial bond yield spread. 
Large firms may have the motivation to manage their earnings downward or give a 
pessimist image about the quarterly earnings to the market because they crave not be 
noticed by regulators. So the accounting choices are dependent on company political 
visibility6
                                                 
4 Similar results in Gaver and Gaver (1998) show that cash compensation is significantly related with positive 
earnings but are not related to in the cases of losses. 
. Several studies emphasize the earnings reduction to minimize the political 
5 In this case there is no expectations management because these clauses are based only in accounting 
measures, and therefore less relevant to this study. 
6 This matter is not a purpose of this study, however it is important refer political costs reduction is an 
important incentive and that they affects accounting choices. 
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attention and adverse actions by public powers (Hagerman and Zmijewski (1979); Morse 
and Richardson (1983)). In a different perspective Moses (1987) considered the hypothesis 
of smoothing earnings in order to minimize risk and the political visibility. According to 
the author, the earning’s fluctuations are the main variable that influences political 
visibility.  
Capital markets incentives 
Many studies were conducted in order to infer the accounting disclosure impact. Generally, 
the conclusions lead to the evidence that capital market react significantly to the 
unexpected new information. The earnings relevance assigned by market participants    
constrains companies’ decisions to maximize certain indicators. Graham et al. (2005) 
conducted a survey and interview more than 400 executives. They found that 51% of CFOs 
state that earnings are the most important financial metric. This finding reflects superior 
informational content in earnings over the other metrics, such as revenues and cash-flows. 
Several benchmarks are proposed in literature, such as earnings the same quarter last year, 
analysts forecasts and profits (Degeorge et al. (1999); Degeorge et al. (2005); Brown et al. 
(2005). Further literature suggests that the market cares about earnings benchmarks. (Barth 
et al. (1999) found that, all else constant, firms that report continuous growth in annual 
earnings are priced at a premium relative to other firms. Bartov et al. (2002) found that the 
“habitual betters”7
It is well known that earnings benchmarks are the main objective of managers, and 
meeting or beating these benchmarks is an important issue in view of the fact that it 
materializes in a market premium. Executives believe that hitting earnings benchmarks 
builds credibility with the market and helps to maintain or increase their firm’s stock price. 
On the other hand, missing these benchmarks (such as analyst’s forecasts) results in 
adverse consequences such as the increase of uncertainty about future performance and 
 report superior future operating performance. 
                                                 
7 They define “habitual beaters” as firms that report earnings higher or equal to analysts forecasts. 
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prospects, and also highlights firm’s financial problems8
2.3 Meet or beat expectations 
. In the next section we describe 
concept of meeting or beating expectations, as well as its importance in relation to the 
reactions of capital market. 
The concept of meeting or beating expectations for quarterly earnings is now well 
embedded in corporate culture and gives an important measure to evaluate managers’ 
performance. The accounting literature has documented an increased interest by companies 
to meet or beat expectations, especially since the early 90s. Therefore, the companies 
employ a variety of strategies to achieve the MBE.  
Empirical evidence shows that meeting or beating expectations results in a significant 
market premium, increasing the share price (Bartov et al. (2002); Dopuch et al. (2008); 
Athanasakou et al. (2008); Kasznik and McNichols (2002)). Brown (2001) and Matsumoto 
(2002) documented a disproportionate number of cases that meet or beat analysts' 
expectations. Koh et al. (2008) concluded that there was a change in the expectations and 
earnings management to beat analysts’ forecasts, after the financial scandals of 2000 and 
2001 and the entry into force of SOX (Sarbanes-Oxley) regulation. Specifically, they found 
an increase in the manipulation of expectations. In contrast, Bartov and Cohen (2008) 
conclude that there is a decrease in the MBE in the post SOX. The difference is mainly due 
to the sample chosen. 
The existence of market incentives for companies to be able to meet or beat expectations 
has had a high importance in the literature on accounting and finance. The empirical 
literature faces the MBE from different perspectives with regard to their incentives, 
                                                 
8 When a company is unable to provide results which corroborate with the predictions, it is because the 
company is facing serious financial problems. 
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focusing on the characteristics of firms that achieve the MBE and the mechanisms used for 
the MBE (earnings and expectations management).  
Consequences of failure to MBE 
When market participants recognize that firms engage in expectations manipulation, they 
penalize such firms. Graham et al. (2005) in their survey inquired the CEOs about the 
consequences of failure to meet expectations. They showed that the two top consequences9 
of a failure to meet earnings benchmarks10 are an increase in the uncertainty about future 
prospects, and a perception among outsiders that there are deep previously unknown 
problems at the firm11
Dechow et al. (1996) found empirical evidence that firms who have committed 
irregularities in financial statements witnessed the lowering in their stock prices by 9%. 
After the financial scandals in 1990s the market participants reduced their confidence in 
the financial information reported. This lack of credibility increase firms cost of capital 
because investors perception of firm value.  
. Brown et al. (2005) provided evidence that investors penalize firms 
for reporting quarterly earnings missing analyst’s estimates. 
In the next two sections we will delineate the two mechanisms most often cited in literature 
to achieve MBE. Then we present some relevant empirical studies on MBE. 
                                                 
9 Optional answers that occupied the third, fourth, fifth and sixth position respectively were: (i) “we have to 
spend a lot of time explaining why we missed rather than focus on future prospects”(58,2%); (ii) “it leads to 
increased scrutiny of all aspects of our earnings release”(37,6%); (iii) “outsiders might think that our firms 
lacks the flexibility to meet the benchmark”(28,1%); and (iv) “ it increases the possibility of 
lawsuits”(25,7%). 
10 They survey evidence that indicates four important metrics for earnings: (1) same quarter last year; (2) 
analysts’ consensus estimate; (3) reporting a profit; and (4) previous quarter EPS. 
11 The authors compare these responses with the earnings guidance and the importance of these concerns 
increases with the degree of guidance. 
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2.3.1 Earnings management as a device to MBE 
Although our study will not focus on the identification of earnings management, we will 
consider it an important issue, and thus we will present a brief remark.  
Identifying empirically the management of earnings is not a simple process. Because 
managers want to avoid lawsuits, loss of reputation and credibility, they camouflage such 
practices (Kasznik, 1999). Despite this, the hypothesis of earnings management has been 
admitted in the financial and accounting field. In fact, there has been growing concern 
about the earnings management, not only in practical level as at the academic level.  
The earnings management is interpreted differently by scholars and by practical and 
regulatory entities. Until the late 1990s, earning’s management was seen by academics as a 
form of personal incentives for managers. However, before the start of the decade it has 
never been studied how earning’s management could be used as a tool to meet or beat 
analysts' forecasts and to create a favorable reaction of capital markets. Dechow and 
Skinner (2002) showed a literature review on the different perspectives of earnings 
management and on the reasons why it is viewed differently by academics and 
practitioners. One of the reasons to scholars consider earnings management as ineffective, 
is the hypothesis of efficient markets. If markets are efficient, earnings management are 
deduced by investors and reflected on share prices.  
From the vast literature on the earnings management we can refer to this practice as the use 
of the existing flexibility in accounting rules to change released information. To fit these 
practices, the disclosed information will change the perception of users about company 
performance. Earnings management only encompasses practices using the flexibility of 
standards and therefore not fraudulent. To be considered earnings management there has to 
be an intention by management to change the perception about the company's performance. 
The use of judgments in financial reporting is useful if it is used only with the purpose of 
informing. The problem arises when these judgments are used to deceive and help 
companies to achieve a higher perceived value.  
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To identify the management of earnings is important to recognize the accruals component 
of accounting results, which are easier to manipulate than cash flows. Brown and Pinello 
(2008) found empirical evidence that analysts’ accruals forecasts are more easily achieved 
or exceeded by management than the analysts’ cash flows forecasts. Cash flows can only 
be changed based on real decisions, namely the manipulation of actual results. This 
mechanism (Bartov and Cohen, 2008), could also be used by management to achieve 
desired results. DeFond and Park (1997) showed that managers are motivated to smooth 
the income between periods, to meet or beat market expectations. They found that if 
managers of firms experiencing a “poor” performance in the current period and expecting a 
“good” performance in the next period, utilize their discretionary accruals to increase 
income in the period. Conversely, they use discretionary accruals to reduce income in the 
periods experiencing a good performance.  
According to Dechow and Skinner (2002), manipulation of the results will only be 
effective if it distort the assessment that investors make about the company, and this 
distortion is only possible because there is information asymmetry.  
Abarbanell and Lehavy (2003) tested whether the direction and magnitude of earnings 
management of firms is affected by the sensitivity of their stock prices to earnings news, 
and conclude that firms with higher price sensitivity12
Many studies give a definition on earnings management. All of them agree that the concept 
encompasses changing the perception of stakeholders
 are more likely to engage in income-
increasing or income-decreasing earnings management to report earnings equal or above 
analysts’ forecasts.  
13
                                                 
12 They use the analysts’ stock recommendation as a proxy to stock price sensitivity. They argue that firms 
with higher growth expectations and glamour designations have stronger incentives to manage earnings to 
meet or beat analysts’ earnings forecasts than other firms. 
 about the performance of the 
company, and it is limited to practices that use accounting standards flexibility and 
13 Stakeholders include current or potential providers of debt and equity capital, providers of labor, financial 
intermediaries (e.g., auditors, financial analysts, and bond rating agencies), regulators, suppliers, and 
customers. 
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therefore are not fraudulent. In the Table 3 we present same earnings management 
definitions found in literature. 
Table 3 - Definitions on earnings management 
Author Definition 
Schipper (1989:104) 
“… a purposeful intervention in the external 
financial reporting process, with the intend of 
obtaining some private gain (as the opposed to, say, 
merely facilitating the neutral operation of the 
process…” 
Healy and Wahlen (1999:368) 
“Earnings management occurs when managers use 
judgment in financial reporting and in structuring 
transactions to alter financial reports to either 
mislead some stakeholders about the underlying 
economic performance of the company, or to 
influence contractual outcomes that depend on 
reported accounting numbers.” 
Mulford and Comiskey (2002:3) 
“The active manipulation of earnings toward a 
predetermined target, which may be set by 
management, a forecast made by analysts, or an 
amount that is consistent with a smoother, more 
sustainable earnings stream.” 
Leuz et al. (2003:506)  
“The alteration of firms’ reported economic 
performance by insiders to either mislead some 
stakeholders or to influence contractual outcomes.” 
Vast literature refers to earnings and expectations management as instruments to achieve 
earnings benchmarks. We do not extend our study on earnings management, even though it 
is an important aspect in FNG and a mechanism to meet or beat earnings market 
expectations. In the next section we will present the other instrument to meet or beat 
expectations, which is the expectations guidance. 
2.3.2 Expectations management as a device to MBE 
Before development of expectations guidance we expose the disclosure context in which 
forecasts are made, the impacts of disclosure of informal information and management 
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behavior. We also explain how analysts forecast could be a reasonable proxy to market 
expectations. 
Disclosure environment  
Managers make disclosures to investors and analysts through a variety of channels using 
both formal and informal disclosures (Rao and Sivakumar, 1999)14. The main purpose of 
accounting research is the formal disclosure, such as financial accounting reports. 
However, formal disclosures represent only a portion of the disclosure process. On the 
other hand, informal disclosures have increasingly become the main instrument to release 
relevant and timely information to the market. Anilowski et al. (2007) found in their 
sample that there has been a substantial increase in earnings guidance over the 1994 to 
2003 period, increasing from 10% in mid 1990s to 25% in 2001-2003. They also found 
that earnings guidance is majority quarterly and provide information about economic 
aggregates15
                                                 
14 To an extensive revision on empirical corporate disclosure literature see: Healy and Palepu (2001) 
Ramnath et al. (2008)  
. They also considered the timing of guidance during the quarter and 
concluded that, in relative terms, managers tend to deliver neutral guidance early in the 
quarter, downward guidance toward the end of the quarter, and upward guidance after the 
end of the quarter. They also found that guidance informativeness increase as the quarter 
progresses. Also, Richardson et al (2004) found that analysts tend to issue optimistic 
forecasts early and slightly pessimistic forecast late in the forecasting period. Therefore, 
many companies disclose information with informal means, such as press releases, 
promotional materials, speeches, and conversations with analysts (Brown and Higgins, 2005). 
Given the role of informal disclosures, research on forecast guidance is important because it 
improves our understanding about the reasons and the vehicles to firms publicize informal 
disclosures. 
15 If managers have stronger incentives to disclose bad news than good news, aggregate guidance is less 
likely to be informative. Still, if these incentives are relatively constants over quarters, rational markets 
participants will deduce market’s overall earnings news from the relative extent of downward guidance.  
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The issue of expectations management is important to understand the earnings surprise games 
and their implications in public policies. In the majority of countries, it has a heightened 
concern about the regulation of formal disclosures, while public policies regulating informal 
disclosures are practically not in attendance. Never the less, informal disclosures, such as press 
releases and communications to shareholders remain almost unbound of regulation. The US 
has almost no direct regulation regarding informal disclosure (Brown, 2005). In Continental 
Europe, EC Listing and Reporting Directives regulating disclosures hold on to the principles of 
materiality, clear disclosure, current information, standard format, advisory statements in 
advanced statements, and equal treatment of investors. However, the substance and timeliness 
of informal disclosures are not issued to regulatory supervision (Baums, 2002). 
Kasznik (1999) focused on the costs associated with voluntary disclosure made by 
managers. Many public corporations fearing the costly consequences of earnings forecasts 
errors did not disclose earnings projections. Such costs can be the litigation costs and loss 
of reputation for accuracy16
A relevant conclusion by Bowen et al. (2002) predicts that the impact of informal 
information, such as conference calls, on reducing the information asymmetry and 
improving accuracy in analysts forecast. Dye (2001) cited by Beyer et al. (2008: 301) 
predicted that “conditions under which firms voluntarily disclosure all their private 
information. These conditions include: (i) the disclosure is costless to the firm; (ii) investors 
know that the firm has, in fact, private information; (iii) all investors interpret the firm’s 
. Brown and Higgins (2005) provided evidence on earnings 
forecast guidance by UK firms. The authors argued that in strong investor protection 
environments, characterized by common law and market orientation, managers have 
greater incentives to avoid missing earnings forecasts. A higher level of regulation 
increases the tendency to managers engage in forecast guidance instead of earnings 
management, due to tighter financial reporting and less rigorous disclosure regulation. 
                                                 
16 The level of investors’ protection regulation is correlated with litigation costs. Shareholders may be 
motivated to lawsuits when managers fail their predictions and claim that managers are not to disclose the 
true financial information. 
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disclosure in the same way and the firm knows how investors will interpret the firm’s 
disclosure; (iv) the firm can credibly disclose its private information; and (v) the firm cannot 
commit ex-ante to a certain disclosure policy”. 
Analysts forecasts as a proxy to market expectations 
As noted, analysts’ earnings forecast are an important benchmark that managers try to 
achieve (Degeorge et al., 1999; Degeorge et al., 2005; Graham et al., 2005; Brown et al., 
2005) and a representative proxy for earnings market expectations O'Brien (1988)17. 
Givoly and Lakonishok (1984) also found evidence that financial analysts’ forecasts of 
earnings are significantly more accurate than predictions made by naïve models that simply 
extrapolate the past earnings trends. Fried and Givoly (1982) compared the accuracy of 
analysts’ earnings per share forecasts with two naïve models: (i) a simple time-series 
model18 (which assumes that next earnings per share is equal to the last earnings per share 
plus a constant drift term); and (ii) a cross sectional model 19
Earnings also represent an important variable in stock valuation and selection and their 
forecasts are considered, therefore, important for predicting future returns. The evidence on 
the usefulness of analysts’ forecasts indicates that they are used by investors and, in fact, 
 (which projects earnings per 
share of individual companies based on their association with market wide changes in 
earnings). Their results, which were based on about 100 mean forecasts in each of the 11 
years 1969 to 1979, showed analysts’ forecasts to be more accurate, on average, than the 
two naïve models. The analysts’ forecasts have a mean relative error of 16,4% over the test 
period, which is significantly lower than the mean error of either, the time series model 
(19,3%) or cross-sectional model (20,3%). 
                                                 
17 She concluded that the most current available forecasts are more accurate than mean or median of all 
forecasts available. This suggests forecast timeless as a characteristic for distinguish better forecast. She also 
found that forecasts are more accurate than time series models. 
18 Pt = At-1+Ct, where At and Pt are the actual and predicted earnings per share at time t, respectively, and Ct is 
the arithmetic past growth in earnings per share.  
19 Pt = At-1+αt + βt Amt, where At and Pt are the actual and predicted earnings per share at time t, respectively, α 
and β are regression coefficients, and Amt is the change in market index of earnings. 
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can serve as a reasonable proxy for the unobservable market expectations of earnings, 
because investors behave in a way which is more consistent with analysts’ forecasts. The 
main reason for analysts’ earnings forecasts accuracy is that they are not limited to the 
information from the past and capture both the time-series property and cross-sectional 
dependence of the earnings series.  
In conclusion, unless models rely on private information, the accuracy of analysts’ 
forecasts over predicting value models (defined above) is valid due to market inefficiency. 
Givoly (1985) predictive that investor tend to act according to analysts’ forecasts, which 
are surrogate for market expectations of earnings. 
Expectations guidance 
The academic literature generally focuses on managing reported earnings upward as a way to 
avoid negative earnings surprises, (Healy and Wahlen, 1999), but the business press considers 
downward forecast guidance as crucial to the earnings surprise game (McGee, 1997; Vickers, 
1999). We focus on downward forecast guidance as a way managers avoid negative earnings 
surprises. The expectations’ management can be achieved through public disclosures that 
have only intention to change the earnings expectations of a particular company. The 
expectations guidance is one of the mechanisms, along with earnings management, that 
management has at its disposal to establish or alter market expectations about future 
corporate performance.  
After the financial scandals in the beginning of the decade, increased regulation on the 
reported financial information changed management behavior in order to report earnings 
that exceed expectations. Empirically, evidence shows that managers prefer to engage in 
expectations management over earnings management. Koh et al. (2008) and Bartov and 
Cohen (2008), showed that after the financial scandals early in the decade there was a 
decrease in earnings management and higher firms dependence on downward analysts’ 
expectations. Athanasakou et al. (2008) found an increase in earnings guidance over 
earnings management after the beginning of the decade. These results suggest that market 
became more skeptical on financial information and more vulnerable on market 
expectations. 
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Firms’ managers typically have more information about expected profitability than 
outsiders. This information asymmetry makes it difficult for investors to differentiate 
between investments opportunities with high profitability from those with low profitability. 
Managers exploit this information asymmetry to change market firms’ image and change 
investment decisions of potential investors. This occurs through public announcements that 
affect the perception of analysts about the companies’ performance and result in an MBE 
at the time of earnings announcement. Thus, managers can disclose information that does 
not reflect the companies’ real situation to lower market expectations.  
Managers with bad news release essentially all of their news at the preannouncement date, 
while managers with good news release about half of their news, Soffer et al. (2000). None 
of the less, firms with negative earnings announcement surprises have significantly lower 
excess returns for the period from just before the preannouncement to just after the 
earnings announcement. This finding is consistent with the observed disclosure strategies, 
whereby managers attempt to avoid negative earnings announcement surprises, and 
suggests that how information is presented can affect the market’s reaction to that 
information. Brochet et al. (2008) argued that earnings guidance is expected to be 
informative to the market because it contains management specific knowledge. Further 
than an objective aggregation of interim financial statement values, much like accruals, 
earnings guidance can reduce information asymmetry between the manager and investors. 
Consistent with this, not only have analysts and investors been shown to incorporate the 
news in the management guidance, management guidance has been shown to reduce 
information asymmetry and improve a firm’s reputation for transparent and credible 
reporting. 
In order to explain the phenomenon in which analysts do not adjust for the general 
downward bias in earnings guidance issued by management, Tan et al. (2010) investigated 
both cognitive and incentive factors and their interaction. Their results suggested that 
analysts do not adjust for the general tendency for companies to deliver downward and 
biased guidance, but may adjust after they learn about a firm’s specific bias pattern over 
time. However, the level of adjustment depends on the interactive effects of analysts’ 
incentives and the reliability and magnitude of bias exposed in its guidance trace. Analysts 
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with accuracy incentives adjust for management’s track record of downward and biased 
guidance, but those with relationship incentives do not.  
In Table 4 we denote some of the common definitions of expectations management present 
in literature. It is visible the manipulation feature of information disclosure. 
Table 4 - Definitions on expectations management 
Author Definition 
 King and Rebelo (1990:128) “…management voluntary disclosure predicting results before the release date …” 
Bolliger and Kast (2004:4)  “… public downward information relatively to firm 
future performance.” 
Burgstahler and Eames (2003:259)  “…smooth and continuous downward tendency on 
optimism during a long fiscal period that leads to 
pessimism in period ending ” 
Cotter and Martin (2000:226) “informal disclosure during the fiscal period to 
progressive downward analysts expectations” 
2.4 Empirical works on MBE 
Empirical literature embodies the MBE phenomenon and relates it with a set of financial 
and accounting issues. The vast literature demonstrates the theme relevance. In this section 
we intend to outline empirical works on MBE and present the diversity of relations 
between financial aspects and meeting or beating expectations.  
2.4.1 MBE and stock recommendations 
The beliefs that there are capital market positive reactions to firms that meet or beat 
expectations are pervasive. Several variables related to stock values are used to 
substantiate the market reaction. Abarbanell and Lehavy (2003) related the stock price 
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sensitivity20
According to the methodology used by Abarbanell and Lehavy (2003), also Das et al. 
(2006) examined whether investor and analysts responses to MBE are conditional on 
outstanding stock recommendation. They provided evidence that the proportion of firms 
that meet or beat earnings expectations is greatest for firms with buy recommendations and 
least for firms with sell recommendation. These results show that managerial incentives to 
meet analysts earnings forecasts increases with a more favorable recommendation, and this 
recommendation increases the equity reward (penalty) to meeting (missing) analysts’ 
forecasts. They also found that firms with an unfavorable recommendation that meet 
analysts’ earnings forecasts experience a higher return around the earnings announcement 
date, which is consistent with an investor surprise hypothesis.  
 to the magnitude of earnings management. They found that firms with high 
(low) price sensitivity to relatively small earnings surprises are more (less) likely to direct 
their earnings management towards meeting or beating analysts’ earnings. According to 
findings provided by Healy (1985), they also concluded that firms are more likely to 
engage in income-increase or income-decrease management to report earnings equal or 
above the analysts’ forecasts. On the other hand, firms with low sensitivity to earnings 
news are more likely to engage in creation of reserves as earnings management, leading to 
negative forecast errors. The level of analysts’ outstanding stock recommendations is used 
as a proxy for contemporaneous stock price and, hence, firms’ sensitivity to earnings news. 
Their empirical results provide evidence of equity market incentives for firms to manage 
earnings. 
2.4.2 MBE and information asymmetry  
Despite the attention of meeting or beating earnings benchmarks, such as analysts’ 
consensus forecasts, MBE plays an important role on diminish information asymmetry 
between market participants and managers. Brown et al. (2009) examined the effect of 
earnings surprises on changes in investors trading decisions and research activities. They 
                                                 
20 They used the outstanding level of analyst’s stock recommendations to capture differences in firm’s price 
sensitivity to earnings news. 
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found that asymmetry is lower (higher) in the quarter following positive (negative) 
earnings surprises compared to firms that meet the consensus analysts’ earnings forecasts. 
The relations between earnings surprises and information asymmetry21
2.4.3 Meet or beat earnings and cash-flows expectations 
 are stronger when 
surprises are more likely to capture investors’ attention. Examining the source of these 
changes, they demonstrated that a decreased information search activity is the most 
important factor for asymmetry declining after positive surprises. They also verified that 
negative surprises tend to decrease unaware trading, which plays a dominant role 
increasing asymmetry. Their conclusions suggest that the attention and visibility associated 
with positive earnings surprises are important attributes that influence investor behavior 
over long time periods and are consistent with the Investor Recognition Hypothesis 
(Merton, 1987). In this line of thought Skinner and Sloan (2002) found a large positive 
response to negative earnings surprises for growth stocks. Their evidence is consistent with 
investors having naively optimistic expectations about the prospects of growth stocks. 
Financial analysts generate a number of important products, among them, earnings 
forecasts, stock recommendations, and target stock prices. In recent years, analysts have 
gradually introduced firm´s operating cash flows forecasts. Givoly et al. (2008) showed 
that the percentage of firms receiving earnings forecasts that also receive cash flows 
forecasts increased from 2,5% in 1993 to 57,2% in 2005. This trend and availability of 
analysts’ cash flows forecasts increase the research on meeting or beating expectations of 
earnings and cash flows. 
Brown and Pinello (2008) investigated firms’ propensities to meet or miss earnings and 
cash flows forecasts in the same fiscal quarter. They concluded that companies are most 
likely to meet earnings forecasts than cash flows forecasts22
                                                 
21 They studied the effect of earnings surprise in a long-term period. 
. They also identified the main 
22 The study is based on a sample of firm-quarters with the necessary data to measure cash flows surprises, 
earnings surprise and abnormal returns, during 11 years period, 1997-2007. 
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causes in which some companies miss earnings forecasts and meet cash flows forecasts, 
which are: 
• Adverse valuation consequences of missing earnings forecasts but meeting cash 
flows forecasts are relatively less severe; 
• The analysts following cash flows are relatively higher than earnings; 
•  Firms are in financial distress; 
• The analysts' forecasts lead to extreme positive accruals; 
•  Analysts are less optimistic about the cash flows forecasts than earnings forecasts; 
• Firms manipulate their financial statements; 
• Firms reported decreases in earnings but not cash flows. 
They showed evidence that firms experience adverse valuation consequences when they 
miss earnings and cash flows forecasts. They ranked valuations consequences in four 
categories23
                                                 
23 Valuation consequences were ranked in the following ways: (i) most favorable when firms achieve both 
forecasts; (ii) second most favorable when firms achieve earnings but not cash flows forecasts; (iii) third 
most favorable when firms achieve cash flows but miss earnings forecasts; and (iv) least favorable 
consequences when firms miss both forecasts. 
, and postulated that missing earnings forecasts has the most unfavorable 
valuation consequence. Givoly et al. (2008) examined properties of analysts’ cash flows 
forecasts and compare them to those exhibited by analysts’ earnings forecasts. They found 
that analysts’ cash flows forecasts are less accurate than analysts’ earnings forecasts. 
Along with this, they are less frequently revised and improve a lower rate during the 
forecast period.  
28  Financial Numbers Game - Evidence To The DJ Stoxx 50 Euro Index  
 
 
2.4.4 Meet or beat earnings expectations and the market reaction 
The relevance of earnings was reported in several finance literature. In order to measure 
this impact, empirical studies refer several benchmarks all leading to the same overall 
results. The most usual measure used is the cumulative abnormal return. However, 
researches employ other metrics to outline the value relevance of earnings surprise, such as 
earnings response coefficient (ERC) and price earnings multiple.  
As mentioned above, firms’ managers recognize the importance of reporting earnings that 
exceed expectations. So, they engage in income-increasing or income decreasing activities. 
However, when accounting numbers do not allow them to manipulate earnings, they can 
manipulate expectations thought disclosure of informal information about the firms’ 
performance. 
On this subject, we will present empirical studies on meeting or beating analysts’ earnings 
forecasts and the earnings surprise impact on capital market. 
Bartov and Cohen (2008) considered the so-called "numbers game", i.e., the earnings or 
expectations management to meet or beat analysts' forecasts. In their study, the authors 
tested the changes in strategies used by managers in order to MBE after the accounting 
scandals of 2001 and 2002 and the period after the reform of market regulation SOX. 
Using a sample of 262,754 firms quarters observations in the 1987 to 2006 period, the 
authors concluded that there is a decline in the expectations management in the post-SOX 
period relatively to the mid-90s, which suggests that managers have reduced their 
influence in downward forecasts. The reason for this decline is that managers could chose 
among other mechanisms to meet or beat analysts’ forecasts, such as accruals based 
earnings management and real earnings management activities. One of the original 
contributions of the study is to consider three mechanisms simultaneously: expectations 
management; accruals-based; and real activities earnings management. The study reveals 
that the decline in meeting or beating analysts' earnings forecasts is due to the reduced 
accruals-based management and expectations management. Overall real activities earnings 
management increased in the post-SOX period. Then, capital market participants should 
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pay more attention to earnings management through real activities as a tool to meet or beat 
analysts’ forecasts. 
Koh et al. (2008) investigated if stock market rewards meeting or beating analysts’ 
forecasts after the accounting scandals of the early 2000s, and whether earnings 
management and/or expectations management have changed since the pre-scandals period. 
In opposition to the evidenced by Bartov and Cohen (2008), they found empirical evidence 
that there is an increase in the manipulation of expectations after the financial scandals of 
2001 and 2002. This difference is mainly due to the sample24 chosen. However, both 
studies confirmed that there is a decrease of earnings management in the post scandals. 
The premium market was tested in the period after financial scandals along with 
expectations and earnings management. They concluded that markets react differently in 
pos scandals period to the MBE phenomena. The market assigns a lower premium to firms 
that MBE, in the period after the financial scandals, which shows that the market became 
more skeptical after the scandals25
Athanasakou et al. (2008) analyzed the mechanisms that UK companies use to meet or 
beat expectations. They tested expectations guidance and earnings management as 
mechanisms to MBE. They identified two ways to manage earnings: abnormal positive 
working capital accruals and the classification shifting of core expenses to non-recurring 
. Moreover, they concluded that firms focus in 
expectations management to MBE and became less dependent of earnings management. 
Thapa and Brown (2007) investigate the market reaction to the implementation of SOX act 
and provide evidence of a positive market reaction. Specifically, they found a cumulative 
abnormal return over the three days period surround the approbation and signature of the 
regulation of 1,35%. 
                                                 
24 Koh et al. (2008) based their analysis in a subsample of firms that meet or beat expectations, whereas 
Bartov and Cohen (2008) do not condition on firms who meet or beat expectations. That is, they compared 
firms that use downward expectations management to meet or beat analysts’ forecasts with firms who are 
able to meet or beat expectations without the use of expectations management.  
25 They show empirical evidence that the market Premium for small beaters (beat expectations for less than 
one cent) was disappeared while the market premium for big beaters (beat expectations by more than one 
cent) was diminished. 
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items. Thus, the results over the period from 1994 to 2002 evidenced that pessimist 
expectations guidance increases the likelihood to meet or beat analysts’ forecasts. 
Moreover, they found evidence consistent with the classification shifting small core 
expenses for non-recurring items, in a subset of large firms26
Matsumoto (2002) tested the hypothesis that to certain firms’ characteristics is associated a 
greater incentive to avoid earnings surprises. He concluded that firms with a large transient 
institutional ownership, with a high value relevance of earnings and with a high reliance on 
claims of shareholders, are more likely to meet or beat analysts’ forecasts in the 
announcement date. He also studied the income-increase and expectations decrease in 
order to avoid reported earnings miss expectations. It was tested the relationship between 
firms’ characteristics and the likelihood of (i) positive abnormal accruals and (ii) forecast 
lower than expected
, as a way to meet analysts’ 
forecasts with core earnings. For companies which have resorted to the reclassification of 
non-recurring items and fail the MBE, is associated an abnormal increase in operating 
profit in the fiscal period, a decline in operating profits in subsequent fiscal periods and a 
operating cash outflows in the three following years. The other mechanism used to manage 
earnings, i.e., working capital and positive abnormal accruals, they found no evidence of 
any association between this mechanism and the likelihood of meeting or beating 
expectations. Above all, the study concluded that UK’ firms are more likely to engage in 
expectations guidance to achieve their objective than the use of accounting practices to 
manage earnings, which can generate long-term premium costs. 
27
Rees and Lopez (2002) established evidence of a higher price to earnings multiple for 
firms that beat analysts’ forecasts than for those that do not. They found that the negative 
. The study shows empirical evidence that both mechanisms are used 
by companies to achieve or exceed expectations. 
                                                 
26 These are 121 firms (around 10% of the entire sample) with average total assets of £1,043m, average total 
sales of £1,426m and average market capitalization of £1,576m. 
27 For each firm i, in industry j, in country k, in year t, guidance is the unexpected portion of the earnings 
forecast (UEF), measured as the difference between the consensus analyst earnings forecast (CF) and the 
expected analyst earnings forecast (E[F]) for the period: UEFijkt  =CFijkt – E[Fijkt] 
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response to not meeting forecasts is significantly greater in absolute terms than the 
response to beating forecasts, after controlling for the level of unexpected earning. Meeting 
analysts’ forecasts is a more powerful variable in explaining abnormal returns than is the 
profit or loss position of the firm. Positive earnings surprises have higher ERCs than 
negative earnings surprises in a regression on abnormal returns, even after employing other 
earnings persistence proxies. Managers report more positive forecast errors for three 
market driven reasons: (i) the market attaches a significantly higher multiple to the 
earnings of firms that beat analysts’ forecasts, (ii) the market disproportionately penalizes 
firms that fail to meet expectations regardless of the size of the forecast error, and (iii) the 
market attaches a higher earnings multiple to the earnings of firms that consistently beat 
forecasts. 
Dopuch et al. (2008) found a market premium for firms that meet or beat time-series 
forecasts, and also the highest market premium for firms that meet or beat both analysts’ 
and time-series forecasts, relative to firms that meet or beat one or neither forecast. In fact, 
there is no premium for firms that meet or beat only analysts’, or only time-series 
forecasts. Investors seem to consider both analysts’ and time-series forecasts jointly, with 
the act of meeting or beating both forecasts providing the most credible signal of superior 
future financial performance. This “credibility” premium to firms that meet or beat time-
series forecasts28
Anilowski et al. (2007) investigated whether earnings guidance affects aggregate stock 
returns through its effects on expectations about overall earnings performance and/or 
aggregate expected returns
 is in addition to the premium for meeting or beating analysts’ forecasts. 
This is further evidence that investors view the meeting or beating of both forecasts as the 
strongest signal of enhanced credibility in reported earnings. 
29
                                                 
28 Proxied by the Foster model, 1977 
. The intra-quarter timing of guidance varies as a function of 
29 Their evidence indicates that guidance is increasingly pervasive and representative because there has been 
a substantial increase in guidance over the 1994 to 2003 sample period, with the proportion of firms issuing 
guidance increasing from less than 10% in the mid-1990s to around 25% in 2001-2003, and that firms issuing 
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the earnings news in a systematic way. In relative terms, managers tend to issue neutral 
guidance early in the quarter, downward guidance toward the end of the quarter, and 
upward guidance after the end of the quarter. They found more modest evidence that 
downward guidance is associated with market returns. Market returns appear to respond to 
guidance toward the end of each calendar quarter, when most earnings preannouncements 
are released. There is some evidence that firm-level guidance affects market returns in 
short windows around its release. 
Brown and Pinello (2007) investigated the effectiveness of the financial reporting process 
at restraining earnings surprise games. They documented that, relatively to interim 
reporting, annual reporting reduces the likelihood of income-increasing earnings 
management. Annual reporting also reduces, in a lesser extent, the negative surprise 
avoidance, but increases the magnitude of downward expectations management30
The results provided by Brown (2001) show that the median earnings surprise has shifted 
rightward from small negative (miss analyst estimates by a small amount) to zero (meet 
analyst estimates exactly) to small positive (beat analyst estimates by a small amount) 
during the 16 years, 1984 to 1999. He documented significant positive temporal trends in 
both meeting and beating analysts’ estimates for both profits and losses, but found a 
greater frequency of profits that either met or beat analyst estimates in every year. The 
author consider four internal validity threats, namely temporal changes in: (i) analyst 
forecast accuracy, (ii) the mix of earnings of one sign preceded by earnings of another sign 
. Their 
conclusions suggest that regulatory attempts to monitor corporations' internal checks and 
balances are likely to be more effective at curbing upward earnings management than at 
mitigating negative surprise avoidance. 
                                                                                                                                                    
guidance now represent approximately 45% of Compustat on a value-weighted basis, up from 10-15% in the 
mid-1990s. 
30 Because the annual reporting process is subject to an independent audit and more rigorous expense 
recognition rules than interim reporting, it provides managers with fewer opportunities to manage earnings 
upward. 
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four quarters ago, (iii) the timeliness of the most recent analyst forecast, and (iv) the IBES 
definition of actual earnings.  
Stock market reactions depend on the creditability of management forecasts of improved 
earnings expectations. Lacina and Karim (2004) tested whether a negative stock market 
reaction, associated with a management forecast of near term bad earnings, is lessened by a 
concurrent management forecast of improved longer term earnings expectations. The 
results show that the stock market reaction is significantly less negative when management 
forecasts of bad earnings are followed by management forecasts of improved long run 
earnings expectations than when management forecasts of bad earnings are not 
accompanied by management forecasts of improved earnings expectations. Overall results 
show that the market participants are unable to distinguish management forecasts of 
improved earnings expectations that come true, from those that do not come true. 
Kasznik and McNichols (2002) investigated whether the market rewards firms meeting 
current period earnings expectations, and whether such reward reflects the implications of 
meeting expectations in the current period for future earnings, or reflects a distinct market 
premium. They documented that abnormal annual returns are significantly greater for firms 
meeting expectations, and found that they have significantly higher earnings forecasts and 
realized earnings than firms that do not31
A pertinent study on MBE provided by Bartov et al., (2002) gives us empirical evidence 
on a market premium to firms that meet or beat expectations, after controlling for the 
magnitude of forecast error. They also provided results showing that MBE premium in 
cases of expectations or earnings management is lower but still exists. Expectations 
management is a result of the information of earnings path during the period. They define 
the likelihood of expectations management cases in which the quarter began with a 
. They also concluded that market assigns a higher 
value to firms that meet expectations consistently, controlling for an estimate of the firm’s 
fundamental value. 
                                                 
31 They find that controlling for higher future earnings, firms meeting expectations in one or two years do not 
receive a greater valuation than their fundamentals would suggest. 
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negative error forecast and ends, trough an upward revision, in a positive or zero earnings 
surprise. If the market rewards firms that meet or beat expectations, it will be expected that 
they experience better future performance. The authors provided empirical evidence that 
the premium of MBE is a leading indicator of future performance, therefore informative to 
the market. This premium, and its predictive ability, are only marginally affected by 
whether the MBE is genuine or result of earnings or expectations management. 
Venkatachalam and Wang (2000) examined whether it is cost beneficial for managers to 
guide analysts’ forecasts downward and subsequently meet or beat expectations. They 
found that the cost of lowering expectations, i.e., market reaction to negative forecast 
revision, is lower than the benefits from reporting a positive earnings surprise. Thus, they 
concluded that beating expectations by lowering expectations is cost beneficial. They also 
found that capital market participants do not reward all firms that meet expectations32
Invoking recency and prospect theories,
.  
33 Caylor et al. (2007) examined the association 
between quarterly stock returns and total earnings news conditional34
                                                 
32 Firms that guide analyst forecast downward and subsequently meet expectations experience negative 
abnormal returns. 
 on the timing in 
which earnings information is revealed to the market. They extended prior research by 
investigating the descriptive validity of recency theory to a comprehensive set of potential 
earnings paths. They show evidence that suggests, contrary to conclusions in the prior 
literature, that investors do not always assign more weight to earnings surprises than to 
analyst forecast revisions. The market response to earnings news is more consistent with 
prospect theory. Using a sample of 99,746 firm-quarters from 1985 to 2001, and applying 
an empirical work based on all possible paths that earnings information could had in 
33 Recency theory predicts that when two or more sequential pieces of information are received, greater 
weight is attached to the most recent piece of information. Prospect theory, develop by Kahneman and 
Tversky (1979), does not depend on the timing of information but rather, how the pieces of information are 
broken up and framed to the decision maker. The theory’s utility function is concave for positive news and 
convex for negative news and the loss function is steeper than the gain function. 
34 They define total earnings news as the difference between reported earnings for the quarter and the first 
forecast made in the same period.  
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quarter, they show different results than previous research. Overall, the study provides 
news insights on the stock prices effects of different earnings information paths and the 
benefits of earnings preannouncements that warn investors about negative earnings news. 
2.5 Conclusion 
In this chapter we have define the subject of this dissertation and state the relevance of the 
theme. Mainly, we emphasized the timeliness of the market response to the MBE, and 
denote the motivations and rewards of the financial numbers game, in particular, the 
increase of price shares to reported earnings which are similar or above the market 
expectations. We present a summary of the empirical works on MBE regarding the most 
important metrics to infer the market reaction to earnings surprises. We also related the 
financial number game with market inefficiency and the information asymmetry between 
managers and market participants, investors and analysts. 
This chapter provides foundations to support our research design. Thus, in the next chapter 
we develop our methodology regarding the purpose of the work, and we delimitate our 
hypotheses. 
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Chapter 3 
Research Design 
3.  
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter is intended to provide same insight on the research design and to frame the 
hypotheses to test. In Section 3.2 we summarize the objectives of the research. Section 3.3 
is devoted to the development of the hypotheses beginning with approaching on the 
timeline of earnings information over the quarter and the intrinsic expectations paths. In 
Section 3.4 we present the composition of our sample and the databases needed to obtain 
data. Section 3.5 is dedicated to the methodology applied in our research. In particular, we 
define the event study approach and the methods to calculate the dependent variable. 
Finally, we present our methodology to test each one of the hypotheses. 
3.2 Purpose and objectives 
As seen in the previous chapter, there are several incentives to firms try to achieve market 
expectations. These incentives could be the increasing of share price, the lowering of 
political costs, the increasing of CEOs payments and the lowering of the cost of debt. Our 
study focal point relies on the capital market incentives. Specifically, we intend to test if 
there is an abnormal return in the period immediately after the MBE.  
Managing reported earnings upward and guiding analyst earnings forecasts downward are 
the two ways that managers can use to avoid negative earnings surprises. Most of the prior 
literature has focused on earnings management as a mechanism to meet or beat 
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expectations. We focus on expectations management in a European context. Using a 
sample of the largest firms in Europe, and also the most coverage firms by analysts, we test 
for the existence of expectations management and a MBE premium. Our research is related 
to Bartov et al. (2002) model and we measure expectations management regarding the 
earnings information paths over the quarter. Thus, the work has as its main objectives: 
• Test whether there is, in companies that comprise the DJ Stoxx 50 Euro, any market 
reward to firms that meet or beat expectations, after controlling for the magnitude 
of the earnings forecast errors; 
• Identify the expectations management through the paths of analysts' forecasts; 
• Analyze if investors assign any reward to firms that meet or beat expectations, even 
when managers achieve MBE through expectations management; 
• Test if the market premium differs in cases in which MBE is genuine, from those 
that are achieved using expectations management.  
After the delimitation of the objectives, we now develop our hypotheses regarding the 
main objectives of the study. 
3.3 Hypotheses development 
Our empirical work is centered on the time that information reaches the capital market. 
The expectations are formed after new information arrives to the market. Therefore, to 
better illustrate the hypothesis underlying the empirical work, we present a chronology of 
quarter earnings information. 
Figure 1 shows the events needed to perform the empirical work (i.e., the mainstream 
events with respect to earnings news during the quarter). The earnings announcement of 
the quarter 1−t  is provided early in the quarter t, which gives the first earnings 
information of the quarter. This information is important to analysts create the first 
earnings forecast in the quarter (hereafter FFt). During the quarter new information arrives 
to the market, and consequently analysts revise their forecasts to generate the latest 
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forecast in the quarter (hereafter LFt), made just prior to the earnings announcement date. 
The forecast error (ERRORt), is defined as the difference between reported earnings and 
the first available forecast in the quarter issued after the earnings announcement of quarter 
1−t . The information of total earnings news for a quarter can be disaggregated into two 
different components: (i) the difference between the initial forecast and latest forecast is 
the forecast revision for the quarter (REVt); and (ii) the difference between the last forecast 
in the quarter and the reported earnings per share (EPSt) leads to the earnings surprise for 
the quarter (SURPt). As earnings information throughout the quarter is communicated to 
the market, analysts revise earnings forecasts to reflect their news expectations formed 
after this new information. The new information received by analysts during the quarter is 
measured as the difference between LFt and FFt. The remaining component of forecast 
error for the quarter is the earnings surprise, and reflects the difference between the 
earnings reported and the last forecast of the quarter issued prior to the earnings 
announcement date. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Adapted from Bartov et al. (2002) 
 
 
 
Figure 1 - Earnings disclosure timeline 
Beginning of 
the quarter, t 
EPSt-1  End of the 
quarter, t 
LF FF EPSt 
REVt 
ERRORt 
SURP t 
Return Accumulation of the 
Forecasting Period 
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Table 5 denotes the primary variables to the empirical work along with their definitions. 
Table 5 - Earnings disclosure timeline: variables definition 
Variables Description 
FFt First forecasts for the quarter - should be at least 3 days after the 
earnings’ announcement for the previous quarter. 
LFt Last forecast for the quarter – should be at least 3 days before the 
earnings’ announcement for the current quarter. 
EPS t Earnings per share for the current quarter 
ERROR t = (EPS t - FF) The overall forecast error for the quarter 
REV t = (LF- FF) The forecast revision for the quarter. Forecast may have at least 20 
days between them. 
SURPt = (EPS t - LF) The earnings surprise for the quarter. 
From the Figure 1 we can draw thirteen different earnings information paths resulting 
during the quarter, presented in Figure 2 and Table 6. The paths began with the signal of 
the forecast error, which leads to three different categories: positive, negative and zero. 
Holding the forecast error constant, the earnings information path can differ depending on 
the sequence of events that occurs during the period. The underlying paths facilitate the 
understanding and the inferring of expectations management. Management has an active 
role in the timeline of earnings news, i.e., it can influence how earnings information is 
communicated to the market by providing earnings preannouncements. In Figure 2 we 
identify the earnings information paths. 
Figure 2 illustrates all the paths that earnings information can have in the quarter. The 
optimal earnings information path is the one that maximize the share price in the earnings 
announcement date observed in abnormal return. Whenever there are negative errors, the 
optimal earnings information path is given by the negative revision and positive surprise, 
since it is the only one that ends with a positive earnings surprise. The earnings 
information path that ends with a positive earnings surprise indicates that firms beat the 
expectations. The second most optimal earnings information path, which began with a 
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negative error, is the one that ends with a zero earnings surprise. The zero earnings surprise 
indicates that firms meet the expectations 
 
Figure 2 - Possible expectations paths 
Source: Adapted from Caylor et al. (2007) 
Within the three possible information paths in the zero error classification, the only one 
that ends with a positive earnings surprise is the one with a negative revision. This path is 
42  Financial Numbers Game - Evidence To The DJ Stoxx 50 Euro Index  
 
 
the most optimal path, which leads to the “beat expectations”. The “meet expectations” 
happens when the information path ends with a zero earnings surprise.  
When earnings error is positive, there are three possible information paths that results in 
earnings surprise. All these three information paths are possible optimal paths. The least 
optimal path is a positive revision that exceeds the earnings error resulting in a negative 
earnings surprise. The information path over the quarter became essential to form market 
expectations.  
Table 6 - Expectations paths 
ERROR REV SURP Expectations paths Expectations path number 
Positive 
+ + Up-up (1) 
+ - Up-down (2) 
- + Down-up (3) 
+ 0 Up-zero (4) 
0 + Zero-up (5) 
Negative 
- - Down-down (6) 
- + Down-up (7) 
+ - Up-down (8) 
- 0 Down-zero (9) 
0 - Zero-down (10) 
Zero 
+ - Up-down (11) 
- + Down-up (12) 
0 0 Zero-zero (13) 
Source: Adapted from Bartov et al. (2002) 
Market participants observe the earnings information during the period, and make an 
opinion about firm quarterly earnings. As noted, analysts’ forecasts are a reliable proxy for 
market expectations. Hence, the expectations path results from the analysts’ forecasts over 
the quarter. If managers became active in this expectations game, they provide information 
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to the market in order to condition the market participants’ expectations. In Table 6 we 
denote the “expectation path” explained above. 
According to earnings information paths, meeting expectations correspond to the paths that 
ends with “Zero”, and beating expectations correspond to paths that ends with “Up”35. 
Namely, earnings surprise signal gives us the constraint to the MBE phenomena. The paths 
that end with “down” show the cases where firms are not able to report earnings36
A common characteristic of prior research in this area is that it associates all individual 
information paths into aggregate groups, when reporting results. Kasznik and Lev (1995) 
empirically examined ten unique information paths and aggregated those paths into four 
groups (warning or no warnings for positive or negative earnings surprise firms). Similarly, 
Soffer et al. (2000) investigated eight information paths but aggregated them into two 
groups, positive and negative earnings preannouncements. Bartov et al., (2002) examined 
thirteen paths, but in the statistical tests they aggregated them into three groups based on 
the earnings surprise signal.  
 that 
corroborate with market expectations.  
Similarly to Bartov et al. (2002), our research is based on all the expectation paths to infer 
the presence of expectations management. Empirical research on market reward combines 
all the paths depicted in Figure 2. Therefore, the hypothesis are conducted by: (i) whether 
there is a market premium associated with MBE, (ii) test whether there is expectations 
management analyzing analysts forecasts over the quarter, and (iii) test the relationship 
between the likelihood of expectations management and the reward of MBE. 
                                                 
35 Bartov et al. (2002) show that beat expectations is associated with higher return than just meeting 
expectations. 
36 The expectations missing inform the market that managers were unsuccessful in expectations or earnings 
management. According to Soffer et al. (2000) market penalize firms that are unable to meet expectations.  
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3.3.1 Hypothesis relating to market premium 
As well stated by prior literature, investors assign a reward to firms that meet or beat 
analysts’ forecasts (proxy to market expectations). If the market is efficient, firms that meet 
or beat analysts’ forecasts do not experience higher shares prices leading to a market 
premium. In other words, meeting or beating analysts’ forecasts do not causes any 
investors’ overreaction, since the prices already reflects these information. Kasznik and 
McNichols (2002) found that annual market adjusted returns are higher for firms that meet 
analysts’ forecasts, than those that miss them. Skinner and Sloan (2002) documented a 
market penalty for firms that miss analysts’ forecasts. Dopuch et al. (2008) reasserted prior 
research and documented a market reward for firms that meet or beat analysts’ forecasts 
irrespective of whether earnings or expectations are managed. 
Bartov et al. (2002) found empirical evidence of a market reward for firms that persistently 
meet or beat market expectation. Similarly to Bartov et al. (2002), we intend to 
hypothesize about the presence of a market premium for firms that report earnings 
encompass analysts’ forecasts. If the expectations path is not informative regarding the 
firm future performance, and investors are rational, the expectations path should not affect 
the abnormal return for the quarter. So, there should be no reward for meeting or beating 
analysts’ forecasts.  
H1: After controlling for forecast ERROR, there is a premium to MBE. 
3.3.2 Hypotheses relating to expectation management 
Our tests, related to the expectations management, corroborate with Bartov et al. (2002) 
empirical study. In their sample they found evidence that firms engage in forecast guidance 
to MBE. To infer expectations management we must observe the expectations paths during 
the quarter37
                                                 
37 See Figures 1 and 2. 
. To test the presence of expectations management we perform two tests. The 
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first, contrasts earnings surprise distribution with a hypothetical distribution, assuming that 
there is no mid-term analysts’ forecasts review. The hypothetical distribution is consistent 
with the variable ERROR38
H2: The relative frequency of SURP negative is smaller than the relative frequency 
of negative ERROR  
. If there is a positive earnings surprise, and the first forecast 
leads to a negative error, it indicates a presence of downward forecast guidance. On the 
other hand, if the review only contains new information that reaches the market without 
there being any effort by management to manipulate the expectations, it will not be 
registered no difference between the frequency of negative results of surprises and negative 
forecast errors.  
In the second test we compare the observed signal of earnings surprise with the sign it 
would have if there were no interim forecast revision. The interim forecast revision can 
have an important role in earnings surprise signal39
                                                 
38 ERROt= EPSt-FFt – difference between the reported earnings per share for the quarter and the first forecast 
available for the quarter and SURPQ is the difference between the earnings per share reported and the last 
forecast available for the quarter. 
. As noted above, if there is no forecast 
revision the earnings surprise sign would be the same as the sign of the quarterly forecast 
error. Observing a negative forecast error that ends, through a sufficiently large downward 
revision, with a positive earnings surprise is thus consistent with expectations 
management. Then, a positive forecast error that ends, due a sufficiently large upward 
forecast revision, with a negative earnings surprise is inconsistent with expectations 
management. Thus, if there was no expectations management, the proportion of 
observations in which the analysts’ revision compensates the prediction error signal to alter 
the sign of the earnings surprise results should be identical in cases of negative and 
positive errors.  
39 If there were no forecast revision FF (first forecast for the quarter) is equal to LF (latest forecast for the 
quarter). 
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H3: The proportion of cases with negative ERROR that ends with a positive or zero 
SURP is greater than the proportion of cases of positive or null ERROR ending with a 
negative SURP. 
3.3.3 Hypothesis regarding the association between MBE premium and 
expectations management 
Managers have stronger incentives to achieve MBE. As noted in prior research, managers 
can achieve MBE toward earnings and expectations management (Bartov et al., 2002; 
Athanasakou et al., 2008; Bartov and Cohen, 2008; Kasznik, 1999). After the financial 
scandals in the early 2000s, and due to the increasing regulation, managers fear litigation 
costs and chose expectations guidance over earnings management. If market participants 
identify the role of managers in the MBE, they would not assign any reward in cases where 
that MBE is more likely achieved through expectations management. 
H4: The premium of MBE is lower in cases where it is more likely that there is 
expectations management. 
3.4 Sample and data 
The sample consists of firm-quarter observations spanning the period from January 2005 to 
December 200940
The index provides a representative sample of the Eurozone companies covering twelve 
countries: Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, 
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal and Spain. The index also captures approximately 
60% of the free float market capitalization of the EURO STOXX Total Market Index 
(TMI), which in turn covers approximately 95% of the free float market capitalization of 
. The companies included in the sample are the constituents of the DJ 
STOXX 50 Euro Index, which cover fifty of the European largest companies.  
                                                 
40 We made a first analysis beginning on January 2004 and ending on December 2009. However, considering 
an additional year does not significantly increase the number of observations. To that matter, we decide 
restring our sample period to 5 years. 
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the represented countries. Our sample is constituted by 8 markets that encompass 9 
countries (France, Germany, Spain, Italy, Netherlands, Finland, Luxembourg, Belgium and 
Ireland). 
The sample choice was based mainly in the analysts’ coverage. Only the biggest 
companies are covered by analysts, i.e., analysts have more incentives to follow firms with 
higher market capitalization. Appendix A presents the index constituents firms list along 
with the respectively weighting, market capitalization and market. 
Figure 3 shows the market representation in our sample. The larger and liquid markets in 
Eurozone are represented in our sample. PAR (France) and GER (Germany) are the most 
represented markets, with 35.58% and 27.53%, respectively. The two less represented 
markets are BRU (Belgium and Luxembourg) and ISE (Ireland), with 1.70% and 0.97% 
respectively.  
 
Figure 3 - Market weighting of the sample 
Figure 4 represents the sample weighting41
                                                 
41 Weighting is compute based on the sector market capitalization over the total index market capitalization. 
 by sector. The sample encompasses eighteen 
sectors of large companies in Eurozone. The most represented sector is Banks (19.3%) and 
the less represented sector is Financial Services (0.73%). 
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Figure 4 - Sector weighting of the sample 
Analysts’ earnings forecasts and forecasts dates were obtained in IBES database from 
Thomson Reuters. Since 1976 to annual data, and since 1984 to quarterly data, IBES 
database has been the most important forecasts provider. According to Sharpe (1981:336), 
Nobel Prize, in his classic “Investments”: 
“While IBES is not the only company collecting earnings expectations data (Zacks 
Investment and First Call are prominent competitors), it was the firsts and remains the 
leader in the field…. Before IBES collected such data, consensus earnings estimates were 
difficult to obtain and highly ambiguous.” 
IBES database contains estimates from different companies around the world. There are 
three different sections in IBES database: detail files, summary files and 
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recommendations42
Ramnath et al. (2005) found that IBES actual quarterly EPS data are less reliable than 
Value Line EPS data, and IBES quarterly earnings forecasts significantly outperform 
Value Line
. Detail history contains individual analysts’ estimates by firm, date, 
fiscal period and metric. Summary history contains consensus estimates based on detail 
history. According to Payne and Thomas (2003) IBES has traditionally provided per share 
data on a split-adjusted basis, rounded to the nearest penny. This allows comparability over 
time of the amounts per share.  
43
We obtained actual earnings, and respective releases dates, in the database IBES
 in terms of accuracy and as proxies for market expectations. They also show 
that IBES forecasting superiority can be explained by the combination of IBES's timing 
advantage and the mitigation of idiosyncratic error through consensus building.  
44
• The firm is a component of DJ Stoxx 50 Euro Index. 
. Each 
firm-quarter observation is required to satisfy the following criteria:  
• The firm is covered by the IBES database. Analysts earnings forecasts must follow 
the requirements in Bartov et al. (2002):  
1. For each quarter there are at least two earnings forecasts45
                                                 
42 Over 1,500 researchers at over 400 institutional worldwide rely in IBES’s analysts forecasts data for 
research. 
, which are at least 
20 trading days apart; 
43 Value Line is a New York corporation founded in 1931 by Arnold Bernhard, best known for publishing 
The Value Line Investment Survey, a stock analysis newsletter that is updated weekly and kept by 
subscribers to the print edition in a large black or green binder. 
44 The IBES earnings number differs from the earnings numbers reported in Worldscope (see Abarbanell and 
Lehavy 2000) for a discussion of the difficulties in comparing EPS figures across databases). To improve 
accuracy in our sample we use earnings numbers from IBES. 
45 Bartov et al. (2002) conducted their analysis based on individual analysts’ forecasts and consensus 
forecast, which required at least two individual analysts’ forecasts. They show that these two analysis lead to 
the same main results. Brown and Han (1992) also found similar results using consensus forecasts and 
individual analysts’ forecasts. 
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2. The release date of the first forecast occurs at least three trading days after 
the release of the previous earnings; 
3. The release date of the latest forecast precedes the earnings release by at 
least three trading days. 
The first criterion ensures that there is an initial forecast and a subsequent forecasts 
revision. The at least 20 days apart requirement ensures that the latest forecast reflects a 
truly revision made based in new information. Whereby we use consensus forecasts the 
period between the two forecasts are 30 days apart. The second criterion prevents that first 
forecast only reflect the information given by the previous earnings. The third criterion is 
an attempt to ensure that the latest forecast is not contaminated by knowledge of the actual 
earnings numbers. 
The criterion selection resulted in 636 firms-quarters observations46
Table 7 - Distribution of observations by year 
.  
Year Observations (%) of the sample 
2005 101 15,91 
2006 116 18,27 
2007 126 19,84 
2008 143 22,52 
2009 150 23,46 
Total 636 100,00 
Table 6 provides information about the distribution of observations by year on the period 
of analysis. Recent years had more observations due the increasing in analysts’ coverage. 
                                                 
46 The missing observations results from the absence of analysts’ estimates. 
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3.5 Methods and tests 
3.5.1 Event study 
Event study examines the behavior of firms’ stock prices around corporate events. The role 
of event study in accounting and financial research is important to test market efficiency. 
Ball and Brown (1968) and Beaver (1968) are the pioneers’ works attempts to event study 
and the relevance of earnings announcement. Following works only altered same aspects 
of the event study, such as quarterly earnings instead of annual earnings and the event 
window period.  
Systematically nonzero abnormal returns that persist after a special event are inconsistency 
with market efficiency, in view of the fact that they reflect the incapacity of the market to 
adjust rapidly to new information. Our purpose is to test the presence of abnormal returns 
after the earnings release in case when expectations are met or beat. This behavior is 
inconsistency with the efficient market hypothesis. 
An event study typically tries to examine the stock price behavior after a common type of 
event, such as earnings release. The event might take place at different points of calendar 
time, or be clustered at a particular date. Let 0=t  represent the time of the event. For each 
sample security i, the return on the security for the time period t relative to the event, Rit, is 
 ititit eKR +=   (1) 
where Kit is the normal or expected 47
Given this return decomposition, the abnormal return, eit, is the difference between return 
and predicted return. That is to say, eit is the difference between the return conditional on 
return and eit is the component of returns which is 
abnormal or unexpected. 
                                                 
47 This framework is from Brown and Warner (1980) cited in Kothari and Warner (2007). 
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the event and the expected return unconditional on the event, given by an expected return 
equilibrium model. 
A security’s price performance can only be considered “abnormal” relative to a particular 
benchmark. Thus, it is necessary to specify a model generating normal returns before 
abnormal returns can be measured.  
3.5.2 Dependent variable - cumulative abnormal return 
Our method relies in the market reaction to specific event, which is earnings release. The 
analysis is supported by event study methodology. Therefore, we define two models to 
infer the return unconditional to the event. According to Brown and Warner (1980), three 
models could be used to calculate normal or expected return: mean adjusted returns, 
market adjusted returns and market and risk adjusted returns48
We began to calculate the firm and market return used in the two models. 
. We perform our tests using 
two different models to obtain expected returns, the OLS market model and the market 
adjusted model. Then, we present the methods used to calculate cumulative abnormal 
return starting with OLS market model and ending with market adjusted model.  
Observed daily return to each firm, is given by49:  
(2) 
where Rit is the observed daily return to individual i and Pt  and 1−tP  represent the stock 
price in period t  and 1−t , respectively50
To estimate the parameters for measuring abnormal return we perform the following 
regression, 
.  
                                                 
48 Capital Asset Pricing Model 
49 To obtain daily market return we perform equation (1) using index daily price. 
50 We use the available closed price to each firm. 
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 ititiiit RmR εβα ++=  (3) 
where Rmit is the daily return on the value-weighted market index DJ STOXX 50 Euro, 
and iα  and iβ  are the single factor market model, where iβ  measures the sensitivity of 
returns of ith stock to changes in returns on the market index. According to Warner and 
Brown (1985), the estimation period spans from t = −241 to 1−=t , where t = 0 denotes 
the day of first forecast for the firm-quarter. 
Daily abnormal return is derived from the deviations from the single OLS factor market 
model (equation 3), 
 )
ˆˆ( itiiitit RmRAR βα +−=  (4) 
where ARit is the abnormal return to security i in the day t, measured by the difference 
between the daily observed return for the security i and the expected return obtain from  
OLS market model, and αˆ  and βˆ  are estimated from the OLS regressions of stock returns 
against the value weighted market index for each period. 
To obtain abnormal return using market adjusted model we measure the difference 
between daily return of firm i and the market daily return, according to Warner and Brown 
(1985), 
 ititit RmRAR −=  (5) 
where ARit is the market adjusted daily abnormal return for firm i. 
To obtain cumulative abnormal return we use daily abnormal return from OLS market 
model and market adjusted model. We show results from each model. The cumulative 
abnormal return (CAR) over a specific window period is measure by: 
 
∑
=
=
2
1
)2,1(
t
tt
ittti ARCAR
 (6) 
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where t1 and t2 are start and ending points of the period over which abnormal returns are 
cumulated. Similar to Bartov et al.(2002) we define t1 two days after the first forecast and 
t2 the day following the earnings release date.  
In the next section we will present the methods used to test our hypotheses. We begin to 
illustrate our research path, and end with the exposition of the regression approach 
methodology. 
3.5.3  Methodology  
To better illustrate our methodology path we present Figure 5, showing the research 
design. Tests are conducted in order to identify MBE cases and to investigate the existence 
of a MBE market premium. To test hypotheses 1 and 4, we obtain cumulative abnormal 
return from the OLS market model and market adjusted model. We also use a regression 
approach to test H1 and H4. To test for the existence of expectations management we 
perform similar tests to Bartov et al. (2002), using expectations paths (H2 and H3). 
 
 
Tests  
Market premium Expectations 
management 
Expectations paths tests 
Bartov et al.(2002) 
H2 and H3 
CAR-Cumulative 
Abnormal Return 
 
Regression approach to 
control for the forecast 
error (H1) 
* Market Premium as a 
function to the 
management 
intervention (H4); 
* Regression approach; 
* Bartov et al.(2002) 
* Dopuch et 
al.(2008) 
Figure 5 - Research design diagram 
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3.5.4 Testing MBE premium 
MBE cases are, by definition, cases with a zero or positive earnings surprise. To test for 
the existence of a premium to MBE (H1) we use a regression approach to control for the 
forecast error. Specifically, we test for MBE premium by estimating the following 
regression, 
 ititititititit SURPDMBEDBEATDMBESURPERRORCAR εββββββ ++++++= *543210  (7) 
where i is the firm index and t designates the quarter. CARit is the cumulative abnormal 
return over the period beginning two days following the first forecast (FFit) and ending one 
day after the earnings release. The overall forecast error for the quarter, ERRORit, and the 
end-of-quarter earnings surprise, SURPit, are measured as described in Table 4, and 
deflated by the firm’s stock price at the beginning of the quarter. DMBEit, and DBEATit are 
dummy variables that receive the value of 1 if, respectively, SURPit ≥0 (earnings met or 
exceeded expectations) and SURPit>0 (earnings exceeded expectations). Otherwise, these 
variables receive the value of zero. The interactive variable, DMBE*SURPit, captures the 
extent to which the reward to beating expectations differs from the penalty for failing to 
meet expectations51
We expect β1 to be positive and significant, in line with the findings of the vast body of 
research on the information content of earnings. Under the null of H1, the coefficients β2 
and β3 are not expected to be significantly different from zero.  
, tested by Bartov et al. (2002).  
Dopuch et al. (2008) did not include in their regressions DBEATit and DMBE*SURPit, 
because these variables capture the effect of beating expectations and the extent to which 
the MBE premium differs from the penalty for miss expectations, respectively. Bartov et 
al. (2002) demonstrated that regressions with ERROR or REV are equivalents. Since, by 
definition, ERROR=SURP+REV, decomposing ERROR in the regression would yield a 
coefficient for the revision variable equal to β1. Dopuch et al. (2008) used the variable REV 
                                                 
51 Note that this variable takes on a value of zero when expectations are met. 
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instead of ERROR, because ERROR is highly positive correlated with SURP. Similarly to 
Dopuch et al. (2008) we exclude dummy variables DBEAT and DMBE*SURP, but 
consider variable ERROR instead of REV52
 
. Therefore, we also estimate the following 
regression: 
ititititit DMBESURPERRORCAR εββββ ++++= 3210  (8) 
3.5.5 Testing expectations management 
To infer expectations management we perform two tests according to Bartov et al. (2002). 
In the first test we compare the relative frequency of negative earnings surprise and 
negative forecast error for the quarter (H2). If expectations management occurs, such that 
expectations are dampened leading to downward revisions in earnings estimates, we would 
expect to find that negative earnings surprises are less frequent than negative forecast 
errors. Conversely, if interim forecast revisions only represent the arrival of new 
information without any managerial effort to manage expectations, there should be no 
difference between the frequency of negative earnings surprises and negative forecast 
errors. 
In the second test, we examine the role of the interim forecast revision in affecting the sign 
of the end-of-quarter earnings surprise. Specifically, we compare the observed sign of the 
earnings surprise with the sign of the earnings surprise that would have resulted in the 
absence of an interim forecast revision (H3). As explained above, in the absence of an 
interim revision, the sign of the earnings surprise would be the same as the sign of the 
quarterly forecast error. Observing a negative forecast error that results, due to a 
sufficiently large downward revision, in a positive earnings surprise is thus consistent with 
expectations management. 
                                                 
52 In our sample the variables ERROR and SURP are not highly correlated. 
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3.5.6 Testing MBE premium as a function of management intervention through 
expectations management 
MBE may reflect the fact that firms’ performance is genuinely better than expected or it 
could result from expectations management. If investors can trace the intervation of 
management to MBE, they may not reward such cases with the same premium or any 
premium at all. 
In order to test this hypothesis relating to management intervention, we estimate the 
following regression: 
 itit
subset
itit
subset
ititititit
SURPDMBESURPDMBE
DMBEDMBESURPERRORCAR
εδδ
δδδδδ
+++
+++++=
** 65
43210
 (9) 
CARit is the cumulative abnormal return over the quarter beginning two days following  the 
first forecast and ending the day after the earnings release. ERRORit is the forecast error 
computed as the difference between the actual earnings and the first forecast for the 
quarter, EPS-FFit, standardized by price at the beginning of the quarter. SURPit is the 
earnings surprise computed as the difference between the actual earnings and the latest 
forecast for the quarter, EPS-LFit, standardized by priceat the beginning of the quarter. 
DMBEit is a dummy variable that takes on the value of 1 if SURPit ≥0 and 0 otherwise. 
DMBEsubset is a dummy variable that takes on the value 1 if SURPit ≥0 and, in addition, the 
case belongs to the designated subset of the sample; otherwise DMBEsubset=0. We set 
DMBEsubset to 1 and 0 alternately for MBE observations that are more likely to represent 
expectations management. 
Corresponding to the analysis in the previous section, MBE cases that are more likely than 
others to result from expectations management are identified as cases with a negative 
forecast error that end with a zero or positive surprise (e.g., negative forecast error cases on 
the Down–Zero or Down–Up paths). If investors become aware of expectations 
management and further, do not allocate a premium, or allocate a lower premium to cases 
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where the MBE is achieved due to expectations management (i.e., a rejection of H4), δ4 and 
δ6 in regression (9) are expected to be negative. 
3.6 Conclusion  
In this chapter we developed our research design, delimitating our hypotheses and our 
methodology. This exposition was important to make a proper understanding of the path of 
research regarding the main objectives of the work. 
In the next chapter we present our main results. We also present results to the two metrics 
aplied to measure the dependent variable in our regression approach, the OLS market 
model and the market adjusted model. 
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Chapter 4  Empirical Results 
Chapter 4 
Empirical Results 
4.1 Introduction  
This chapter addresses the main results of our empirical work. We present results from the 
existence of a market reward to firms that meet or beat analysts’ forecasts, the presence of 
expectations management and the association between the market premium and the 
intervention of the management through expectations guidance. 
In Section 4.2 we present the tendency of MBE during our period of analysis. This analysis 
is needed to understand if our sample is comparable to those applied in previous research. 
We follow by presenting the descriptive statistics of our primary variables in Section 4.3. 
Section 4.4 provides the empirical results on the MBE reward. In this section we report 
results of the regression using the two metrics to measure dependent variable and also 
present a comparison between our work and the results obtained in previous related 
research. 
Section 4.5 is devoted to the results of the presence of expectations management observing 
the expectations paths and test for hypotheses 2 and 3. Finally, in Section 4.6, we present 
results of the association between the market premium to MBE and the expectations 
management. 
4.2 MBE tendency 
To ascertain whether our sample is comparable to those employed by previous research 
with respect to the time series pattern of MBE, we produced the distribution of earnings 
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surprises over time. Our sample is not similar to prior research, especially because our 
period is relatively smaller than those employed in previous research on MBE. However 
neither of previous research contain the years after 2005 and because of that is not possible 
to make a proper comparison. Our results, presented in Table 8, illustrate an upward 
tendency in the first three years, followed by a decrease in 2008 and 2009. Specifically, we 
find that the proportion of favorable earnings surprises decreased from about 65% in the 
year 2007 to almost 45% in the year 2008. We find similar results when we compare the 
beat versus met cases. In the last two years it was a decrease in both cases. Is of note that 
the relative frequency of meeting (i.e., zero surprise) increased from 1,98% in 2005 to 
above 6,9% in 2006 and the relative frequency of beating expectations (a positive surprise) 
decreased from 60,40% to 53,45%. 
Table 8 - MBE tendency 
 
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
 
Freq. N Freq. N Freq. N Freq. N Freq. N 
Met or Beat 62,38% 63 60,34% 70 65,08% 82 45,45% 65 53,33% 80 
Met 1,98% 2 6,90% 8 6,35% 8 6,29% 9 5,33% 8 
Beat 60,40% 61 53,45% 62 58,73% 74 39,16% 56 48,00% 72 
Not met 37,62% 38 39,66% 46 34,92% 44 54,55% 78 46,67% 70 
Similar results were achieved when we observe the relative frequency of positive earnings 
surprise (i.e., MBE cases) by quarter. Figure 6 illustrates an upward tendency in MBE. 
With the exception of 2008, there are an increasing in MBE cases. We also noted a 
tendency of meeting or beating expectations in the previous three quarters of the year and 
in miss market expectations in the fourth. This findings corrugate with previous research 
pointing the fiscal quarter the less likely to meet or beat expectations. The reason of that is 
the taxes heaviness and a less preocupation in the market reaction. 
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Figure 6 - MBE tendency 
4.3 Descriptive statistic – primary variables 
Table 7 reports descriptive statistics to primary variables in our sample. We use SPSS – 
version 18 (Statistical Package for Social Sciences) to analyze data.  
The mean of variables Error, Surp and Rev are negative which indicates that in period of 
analysis, the reporting earnings are above analysts’ forecasts. All variables presents means 
and median values with a significantly difference between them, which indicates the 
presence of outliers.  
We also observe that distribution of variable EPS is slightly asymmetric because skenness 
value is close to zero. All the other variables present asymmetric distributions. Variables 
Pit, FF and LF present distributions concentrated to the right with a long tail to the left. 
Variables Error, Surp and Rev are concentrated to the left with a long tail to the right, due 
the negative skenness value.  
Relatively to the Kurtosis measure we can conclude that all variables present distributions 
peaked and leptokurtic. 
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Table 9 - Primary variables - descriptive statistics 
Primary variables 
Full sample N=636 
 Pit FF LF EPS 
Error Surp Rev 
Undeflated 
Mean 40,17 0,87 0,85 0,82 -0,049 -0,025 -0,024 
S.D. 32,92 0,86 0,86 1,20 0,897 0,761 0,272 
25% 13,99 0,27 0,26 0,25 -0,070 -0,058 -0,020 
Median 26,31 0,60 0,57 0,54 0,000 0,010 0,000 
75% 53,51 1,27 1,26 1,25 0,100 0,100 0,010 
Minium 0,00 -0,23 -1,73 -8,71 -10,900 -11,060 -4,140 
Maximum 225,57 4,65 4,64 7,51 3,610 3,610 1,220 
Skewness 1,41 1,68 1,61 -0,49 -7,409 -6,771 -9,968 
Kurtosis 2,07 3,01 3,09 15,01 80,143 86,500 130,900 
Pit - security daily price of stocks 
FF - first consensus analysts forecast for each firm-quarter.. 
LF – last consensus analysts’ forecasts for each firm-quarter. 
EPS – actual earnings per share as reported in I/B/E/S. 
Error - difference between EPS and FF.  
Surp - difference between EPS and LF.  
Rev – difference between LF and FF. 
We can conclude that variables do not present normal distributions, and it reflects the 
presence of outliers. The treatment of outliers is presented in the next section to variables 
inputs in the models53
Results from the tests are present in the next section. We first present results relatively to 
the market premium to MBE cases, followed by tests of expectations management and 
ending with the association of expectations management and market premium. We also 
present results from the calculation of two different CAR metrics, OLS market model and 
market adjusted model. 
. 
                                                 
53 We remove outliers in the variables CAR, ERROR and SURP. Note that ERROR and SURP are the 
variables inputs in the models which are deflated by the price of the beginning of the quarter. 
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4.4 Results for market premium  
To test for the existence of a premium to MBE, we measure the incremental abnormal 
return in cases where expectations are met or beaten, after controlling for the magnitude of 
the quarterly forecast error. 
As noted above, we measure abnormal returns using two different methods, OLS market 
model and market adjusted model. We began to present results from OLS market adjusted 
model followed by the second model. We also use two different regressions to test market 
premium. The first one is consistent with Bartov et al. (2002) model. According to Dopuch 
et al. (2008), in the second regression we exclude dummy variables. 
4.4.1  OLS market model 
Descriptive statistics 
Table 10 reports descriptive statistics of model inputs variables. To improve the statically 
inference in our results, we exclude outliers. Their exclusion limited the sample to 527 
observations.  
Results provide by Table 10, demonstrate that the variables distributions improve if we 
consider outliers exclusion. The mean and median values of variables are close to each 
other. Variable CAR presents a mean slightly positive, 0.8% and a median with 1.7%. 
Variables ERROR and SURP presents equal values to mean and median. According to 
Maroco (2003), to a distribution be assumed as normal the Kurtosis value should be 
contained in the interval]-0,5; 0,5[. Cases where these values are highest than 1 the 
distribution cannot be assumed as normal.  
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Table 10 - Descriptive statistics of variables inputs in the model to test market premium: CAR measured by 
OLS market model. 
Descriptives Statistics 
 
Full Sample N=63254 Without Outliers N=527  
CAR ERROR SURP CAR ERROR SURP 
Mean 0,003 -0,002 -0,001 0,008 0,001 0,001 
Std. Deviation 0,107 0,018 0,017 0,078 0,005 0,005 
25% -0,052 -0,003 -0,002 -0,041 -0,002 -0,002 
Median 0,016 0,000 0,000 0,017 0,000 0,000 
75% 0,063 0,004 0,004 0,059 0,003 0,003 
Minimum -0,741 -0,224 -0,227 -0,219 -0,014 -0,012 
Maximum 0,403 0,085 0,080 0,217 0,013 0,014 
Skewness -0,685 -4,733 -5,097 -0,240 0,014 0,079 
Kurtosis 4,551 46,008 56,411 0,371 0,274 0,337 
CAR is the cumulative abnormal return over the quarter beginning two days after the earliest forecast and ending the day 
following the earnings release. 
ERROR is the forecast error computed as the difference between the actual earnings and the earliest forecast for the 
quarter, EPS-FF; standardized by price at the beginning of the quarter. 
SURP is the earnings surprise computed as the difference between the actual earnings and the latest forecast for the 
quarter, EPS-LF; standardized by price at the beginning of the quarter. 
Correlation  
In Table 11 we present the correlation matrix to the variables inputs in the regression. The 
variables correlations measures are the Pearson correlation coefficient and Spearman 
correlation coefficient. Pearson correlation coefficient can assume values between -1 and 
1. The extremes represent a highest linear association between variables. According to 
Bryman and Cramer (1993), a correct lecture of correlation coefficients are: lower than 
0,19 it is a weak correlation, 0,20 to 0,39 is lower, 0,40 to 0,69 it is a moderate correlation, 
0,70 to 0,89 it is a higher correlation and; 0,90 to 1 it is a very higher correlation. 
Spearman correlation coefficient use observation order value instead of observed value. 
Thus, is not sensitive to asymmetric distributions and the presence of outliers. 
                                                 
54 We reduce the number of observations because the parameters estimated in OLS market model in four 
firms-quarters are not significant and therefore not a measure appropriate for expected return.  
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Table 11 - Correlation matrix of variables inputs in model to test market premium: CAR measured by OLS 
market model  
Correlations Matrix – Without Outliers N=527 
 CAR ERROR SURP DMBE DBEAT DMBE*SURP  
CAR 1,000 0,296** 0,373** 0,375** 0,364** 0,373** 
Sp
ea
rm
an
's 
rh
o 
co
rr
el
at
io
n 
000 000 000 000 000 
ERROR 0,279** 1,000 0,836** 0,686** 0,707** 0,799** 
000 000 000 000 000 
SURP 0,359** 0,833** 1,000 0,850** 0,864** 0,949** 
000 000 000 000 000 
DMBE 0,362** 0,612** 0,738** 1,000 0,884** 0,805** 
000 000 000 000 000 
DBEAT 0,350** 0,633** 0,748** 0,884** 1,000 0,911** 
000 000 000 000 000 
DMBE*SURP 0,304** 0,751** 0,874** 0,577** 0,653** 1,000 
000 000 000 000 000 
 Pearson Correlation  
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level 
The matrix correlation can be use to verify the association level between variables. All 
explanatory variables present a higher correlation between them. Specifically, we can 
observe a very higher correlation between DMBE*SURP and SURP. This association can 
lead to collinearity problems and bias in the OLS estimators. To that matter, we also use 
Dopuch et al. (2008) model that exclude the variable DMBE*SURP55
                                                 
55 As noted earlier this interactiv variable captures the difference of the premium to MBE to the penalty to 
miss expectations, not an issue tested in our research. 
. Although, variable 
SURP and ERROR are highly correlated we do not estimate our model replacing ERROR to 
REV, as documented by Dopuch et al. (2008). It is because REV present innumerous 
outliers, and their exclusion significantly reduced our sample. We can also observe a 
relatively similar correlation between CAR and all explanatory variables. The least 
correlation coefficient is observed between variables ERROR and CAR, which suggests a 
lower significance of the forecast error in the quarterly abnormal return. 
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Regression results 
In Table 12, we present results from the estimation of Bartov et al. (2002) model, using 
regression (8). We also estimate the regression with the presence of outliers, which results 
are present in Appendix C1. However we do not infer the results of this estimation. 
As described in Appendix B we perform F, Breusch-Pagan and Hausman tests to accept or 
reject the null hypothesis associated, respectively, with: (1) only one intercept identify in 
all individuals in cross-section; (2) a null variance, and; (3) the GLS estimators are 
consistent.  
Heterocedasticity is detected using White proposal test. This test depends on the 
assumptions of normality.  The test are conducted based on a original panel model 
(regression 10)56 2ˆ itµ, in which residual terms are estimated . After, we perform the 
following regression estimation, 
 ititit Y υααµ ++=
2
21
2 ˆˆ  (12) 
where itYˆ  are estimated values through regression (10), and α1 and α2 are estimators 
parameters. Under the null hypothesis, α2=0. 
Heterocedasticity is corrected using heterocedasticity adjusted model, provided in 
GRETL57
                                                 
56 Appendix B 
. The model calculates a weighted residuals series. Thought this correction, it is 
computed an OLS estimation and kept the residuals terms. With this regression, the 
residuals squares became an explanatory variable in an auxiliary regression, and the other 
original explanatory variables remains added to residual squares. Thus, coefficients obtain 
in auxiliary regression are used to form residual weight series in the final estimators. 
Consequently, OLS estimation can be done since there is a correction in the residual 
57 GRETL comand: Menu: Model/other linear models/ heterocedasticity adjusted 
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covariance matrix to consider heterocedasticity. Thus and according to Gujarati (2006), the 
estimation is robust and called as GLS (Generalized Least Square). 
We also investigate multicollinearity between variables through variances inflators factors 
(VIF)58
Table 12 - Premium to MBE: results from the estimation of regression (7) using CAR measured by OLS 
Market Model 
 where a value higher than 10 could imply a problem with collinearity. The values 
obtained go from 3,292 (ERROR) to 8,323 (SURP) validating the estimation. 
(t-statistics provided in parenthesis) 
ititititititit SURPDMBEDBEATDMBESURPERRORCAR εββββββ ++++++= *543210  
Dependent Variable: CARi,t OLS Market Model 
Without outliers N=527 
 
β0 β1 β2 β3 β4 β5 R2 
Coeficients 0,016** -1,035 3,831** 0,028* 0,009 0,204 
15,43% 
t-statistc (2,092) (-0,961) (2,265) (1,738) (0,626) (0,105) 
White test Chi2 (12)=26,9304  Prob>Chi2=0,0079 
Breusch-Pagan Chi2 (1)=0,00983  Prob>Chi2=0,92102 
Hausman Chi2 (5)=3,47228  Prob>Chi2=0,627586 
Test F F (45, 474)  =  0,996441   Prob > F =  0,482158 
Heterocedasticity Adjusted 
Coeficients -0,0184* 0,743 2,106 0,031** 0,0098 0,394 
13,07% 
t-statistc (-1,865) (0,647) (0,849) (2,029) (0,788) (0,150) 
CAR is the cumulative abnormal return over the quarter beginning two days after the earliest forecast and ending the day 
following the earnings release (using OLS market model). 
ERROR is the forecast error computed as the difference between the actual earnings and the earliest forecast for the 
quarter, EPS-FF; standardized by price at the beginning of the quarter. 
SURP is the earnings surprise computed as the difference between the actual earnings and the latest forecast for the 
quarter, EPS-LF; standardized by price at the beginning of the quarter.  
DMBE is a dummy variable that takes on the value of 1 if SURP>=0 and 0 otherwise.  
DBEAT is a dummy variable that takes on the value of 1 if SURP>0 and 0 otherwise. 
 
                                                 
58 VIF(j) = 1/(1-R(j)2), where R(j) are the correlation coefficient between variable j and the other explanatory 
variable. 
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As shown in Table 12, the coefficient β2, estimated from the sample without outliers, is 
positive but not significant. Then, we can infer the statistical significance of the earnings 
surprise in the return of the period. The coefficient β3 of 0,031, suggests that the quarterly 
return for firms that meet or beat their earnings expectations is 3.1% above that of all other 
firms, independent of the magnitude of the positive earnings surprise. 
We also estimate the model excluding variables DBEAT and DMBE*SURP according to 
Dopuch et al.(2008). As noted in matrix correlation DMBE*SURP are higher correlated 
with SURP and their inclusion in the model causes non-efficients estimators. 
Multicollinearity between variables was inferred through variances inflators factors (VIF). 
Values obtained go from 2,201 (DMBE) to 4,491 (SURP) which validate the estimation. 
Table 13 - Premium to MBE: results from the estimation of regression (8) using CAR measured by OLS 
Market Model 
(t-statistics provided in parenthesis) 
ititititit DMBESURPERRORCAR εββββ ++++= 3210  
Dependent Variable: CARi,Q OLS Market Model 
Without Outliers N=527 
  β0 β1 β2 β3 R2 
Coeficients -0,0152** -0,988 4,15*** 0,035*** 15,34% 
t-statistc (-2,563) (-0,883) (2,933) (3,699) 
White test Chi2 (1)=22,252 Prob>Chi2=0,004 
Breusch-Pagan test Chi2 (1)=0,05602  Prob>Chi2=0,8129 
Hausman test Chi2 (1)=1,437  Prob>Chi2=0,6967 
Test F  F (45, 476)  =  0,997041   Prob > F =  0,5297 
Heterocedasticity Adjusted 
Coeficients -0,017** 0,154 2,929** 0,0379*** 12,59% 
t-statistc (-2,391) (0,135) (2,047) (3,959) 
CAR is the cumulative abnormal return over the quarter beginning two days after the earliest forecast and ending the day 
following the earnings release (using OLS Market model). 
ERROR is the forecast error computed as the difference between the actual earnings and the earliest forecast for the 
quarter, EPS-FF; standardized by price at the beginning of the quarter. 
SURP is the earnings surprise computed as the difference between the actual earnings and the latest forecast for the 
quarter, EPS-LF; standardized by price at the beginning of the quarter. 
DMBE is a dummy variable that takes on the value of 1 if SURP>=0 and 0 otherwise. 
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The regression is estimated with the presence of outliers. The results are presented in 
Appendix C2. The results from the Table 13 show that β2 and β3
 
are positive and significant. 
This results suggesting that the earnings surprise affects the return of the quarter. The 
coefficient β3 of 0,0379 suggests that the quarterly return for firms that meet or beat 
expectations is higher 3,79% than firms who miss expectations. The coefficient of SURP, β2, is 
2,929, suggesting that 1% of earnings surprise is associated with an incremental quarterly 
return of about 2,9%. 
4.4.2 Market adjusted model 
In this section we present results from testing market premium to firms that meet or beat 
analysts’ forecasts using market adjusted return described above. We use a similar 
approach to that used in OLS market adjusted CAR. We began to present descriptive 
statistics and correlation matrix followed by the results of regression (7) and (8). 
Descriptive statistics 
Table 14 - Descriptive statistic of variables inputs in the model to test market premium: CAR measured by 
market adjusted model 
Descriptives Statistics 
 
Full Sample N=636 Without Outliers N=528 
CAR_ma ERROR SURP CAR_ma ERROR SURP 
Mean 0,002 -0,002 -0,001 0,013 0,001 0,001 
Std. Deviation 0,104 0,018 0,017 0,067 0,005 0,005 
25% -0,028 -0,003 -0,002 -0,030 -0,002 -0,002 
Median 0,012 0,000 0,000 0,015 0,000 0,001 
75% 0,045 0,004 0,004 0,054 0,003 0,003 
Minimum -0,889 -0,224 -0,227 -0,186 -0,014 -0,014 
Maximum 0,351 0,085 0,080 0,210 0,013 0,014 
Skewness -1,501 -4,733 -5,097 -0,054 0,032 0,112 
Kurtosis 10.071 46,008 56,411 0,351 0,311 0,369 
CAR_ma is the cumulative abnormal return over the quarter beginning two days after the earliest forecast and ending the 
day following the earnings release (using market adjusted model). 
ERROR is the forecast error computed as the difference between the actual earnings and the earliest forecast for the 
quarter, EPS-FF; standardized by price at the beginning of the quarter. 
SURP is the earnings surprise computed as the difference between the actual earnings and the latest forecast for the 
quarter, EPS-LF; standardized by price at the beginning of the quarter. 
In Table 14 we provide descriptive statistics using market adjusted return to calculate CAR. 
Similar to the observed in the variables using the OLS market model we identify outliers. 
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Their exclusion limited our sample to 528 observations. The results do not differ in many 
ways from those present in Table 9. Noted that mean from variable CAR_ma increase from 
0,8% to 1,3%. 
Correlation 
In Table 15 we present matrix correlation between variables input in the models. Unlike 
previous model correlation matrix we observe non statistic correlation between variable 
CAR_ma and DMBE, DBEAT and DMBE*SURP (Pearson correlation). We also verify in 
Pearson correlation coefficients that variable DMBE*SURP are statistical uncorrelated 
with all variables. 
Table 15 - Correlation matrix of variables inputs in model to test market premium: CAR measured by 
market adjusted model 
Correlations Matrix – Without OutliersN=528 
 CAR_ma ERROR SURP DMBE DBEAT DMBE*SURP  
CAR_ma 1,000 0,607** 0,720** 0,763** 0,722** 0,686 
Sp
ea
rm
an
's 
rh
o 
co
rr
el
at
io
n 
000 000 000 000 0.049 
ERROR 0,520** 1,000 0,827** 0,676** 0,694** 0,787** 
000 000 000 000 000 
SURP 0,614** 0,823** 1,000 0,849** 0,864** 0,949** 
000 000 000 000 000 
DMBE 0,708 0,603** 0,733** 1,000 0,880** 0,801** 
0,201 000 000 000 000 
DBEAT 0,669 0,622** 0,744** 0,880** 1,000 0,910** 
0,111 000 000 000 000 
DMBE*SURP -0,072 0,049 0,061 -0.012 0 1,000 
0,049 0,132 0,080 0,395 0,498 
 Pearson Correlation  
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level 
Regression results 
In Table 16, we present regression results using CAR obtained with market adjusted model. 
The method is similar to implied in previous section using 528 observations resulting from 
the outliers exclusion. We also estimate the regression to the entire sample, Appendix C3, 
but do not infer results from this estimation. Results from the multicollinearity test show 
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VIF values varies from 1,011 (DMBE*SURP) to 4,912 (DBEAT), which validate the 
regression. 
From results shown in Table 16, we emphasized the homocesdasticity verified, performing 
White test. When we use outlier’s free sample the pooled OLS is the most efficient method 
to estimate regression. Performing F, Breusch-Pagan and Hausman tests we conclude that 
pooled OLS improves our results. 
Table 16 - Premium to MBE: Results from the estimation of regression (7) using CAR measured by 
market adjusted model 
(t-statistics provided in parenthesis) 
ititititititit SURPDMBEDBEATDMBESURPERRORCAR εββββββ ++++++= *543210  
Dependent Variable: CARi,t Market Adjusted  Model 
Without outliers N=528 
 
β0 β1 β2 β3 β4 β5 R2 
Coeficients -0,035*** 0,559 2,259** 0,063*** 0,016* -0,120*** 
53,08% 
t-statistc (-8,865) (0,739) (2,581) (7,683) (1,801) (-3,044) 
White test Chi2 (14)=16,5881  Prob>Chi2=0,27879 
Breusch-Pagan Chi2 (1)=0,199368  Prob>Chi2=0,65523 
Hausman Chi2 (5)=3,28622  Prob>Chi2=0,655952 
Test F F (45, 477)  =  1,20219   Prob > F =  0,179877 
CAR is the cumulative abnormal return over the quarter beginning two days after the earliest forecast and ending the day 
following the earnings release. 
ERROR is the forecast error computed as the difference between the actual earnings and the earliest forecast for the 
quarter, EPS-FF; standardized by price at the beginning of the quarter. 
SURP is the earnings surprise computed as the difference between the actual earnings and the latest forecast for the 
quarter, EPS-LF; standardized by price at the beginning of the quarter. 
DMBE is a dummy variable that takes on the value of 1 if SURP>=0 and 0 otherwise. 
DBEAT is a dummy variable that takes on the value of 1 if SURP>0 and 0 otherwise. 
As shown in Table 16, the coefficient β2, is positive and significant suggesting that 
earnings surprise affects positively the return from the period. Coefficient β3 is positive and 
significant, suggesting that firms that meet or beat expectations experience a higher return 
in the period. Specifically, using market adjusted return to calculate cumulative abnormal 
return, the coefficient from DMBE suggest that MBE firms enjoy a return of 6,3% above 
the other cases, independent of the magnitude of the positive earnings surprise. The 
72  Financial Numbers Game - Evidence To The DJ Stoxx 50 Euro Index  
 
 
coefficient of SURP (β2) is 2,259, suggesting that a 1% earnings surprise is associated with 
an incremental quarterly return of about 2,26%. 
While not formally hypothesized, we also can draw from the regression, results suggesting 
a higher return associated with beating expectations than merely meeting expectations, 
coefficient β4 is positive and significant. Contrarily to previous research we do not find a 
higher premium for meeting expectations than the penalty for missing expectations, β5 are 
negative and significant.  
Table 17 presents estimation results of regression (8) using market adjusted model to 
calculate cumulative abnormal return. We display estimations from the full sample in 
Appendix C4 and sample without outliers (528 observations) in Table 17. We also perform 
test for heterocedasticity and tests to choose between estimation methods. 
Table 17 - Premium to MBE: Results from the estimation of regression (8) using CAR measured by 
market adjusted model 
(t-statistics provided in parenthesis) 
ititititit DMBESURPERRORCAR εββββ ++++= 3210  
Dependent Variable: CARit, Market Adjusted Model 
Without Outliers N=528 
  β0 β1 β2 β3 R2 
Coeficients -0,035*** 0,614 2,399*** 0,076*** 
52,19% 
t-statistc (-9,563) (0,806) (2,841) (12,517) 
White test Chi2 (9)=22,769 Prob>Chi2=0,007 
Breusch-Pagan test Chi2 (1)=0,2755  Prob>Chi2=0,5997 
Hausman test Chi2 (3)=1,439  Prob>Chi2=0,6965 
Test F  F (45, 479)  = 1,23158   Prob > F =  0,151164 
Heterocedasticity Adjusted 
Coeficients -0,033*** 1,270* 1,928* 0,074*** 51,97% 
t-statistc (-9,327) (1,852) (1,924) (12,74) 
CAR is the cumulative abnormal return over the quarter beginning two days after the earliest forecast and ending the day 
following the earnings release. 
ERROR is the forecast error computed as the difference between the actual earnings and the earliest forecast for the 
quarter, EPS-FF; standardized by price at the beginning of the quarter. 
SURP is the earnings surprise computed as the difference between the actual earnings and the latest forecast for the 
quarter, EPS-LF; standardized by price at the beginning of the quarter. 
DMBE is a dummy variable that takes on the value of 1 if SURP>=0 and 0 otherwise. 
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The coefficients signals do not differ from our previous results. However the results from 
heterocedasticity adjusted estimation, provides β1, β2 and β3 positives and significant 
according to previous results from Dopuch et al. (2008). Coefficient from DMBE is 0,074 
suggesting that MBE firms experience a period return above 7,4% the missing firms, 
independent of the magnitude of earnings surprise. Despite to this constant premium, the 
abnormal return to MBE firms is affected by the magnitude of earnings surprise. The 
coefficient from SURP is 1,924 suggesting that firms that meet or beat expectations with 
1% earnings surprise experience a incremental quarterly return of about 1,9%. The 
relevance of earnings enhanced in empirical literature is observed in β1, which is positive 
and significant. 
Table 18 demonstrates a comparison between our results and empirical results from 
previous research on MBE. Panel A, show similar coefficients signs than Bartov et al. 
(2002). However, our sample does not provide significant statistical inferences when we 
use OLS market model to compute cumulative abnormal return. One of the reasons is the 
size of the sample and the estimation problems associated. However the premium to MBE 
cases it is greater in our sample, 3,1% against 2,3% in Bartov et al. (2002). 
When we estimate regression (7) using as dependent variable CAR from the market 
adjusted model we observe coefficients statistical significant and close to those presented 
by Bartov et al. (2002). We do not experience a statistical significant coefficient from the 
parameter ERROR (that reflects the earnings relevance), which is contradictory to previous 
research. Unlike the results presented in previous research, coefficient from parameter 
DMBE*SURP present a negative signal, suggesting that in our sample the penalty for 
missing expectations is higher than the reward to meet or beat expectations. We also 
experience a significant and positive coefficient from the parameter DBEAT, suggesting 
that beating expectations assign a bigger premium than just meeting expectations. Overall 
results suggests that there are a market premium to MBE firms and the quarterly return 
enjoy by these firms is 6,3% above the missing firms. 
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Panel B from the Table 18 illustrate the comparison between ours results and Dopuch et al. 
(2008) results. When we apply regression (8) in our sample, we also find a coefficient from 
parameter ERROR, β1, positive and significant suggesting the relevance of earnings. 
The coefficient on SURP indicates that for our time-period, the earnings surprise 
influences the quarterly return. Although, Dopuch et al. (2008) sample enjoyed a more 
relevance in earnings surprise than ours (2,92% against 7,05%). 
Table 18 - Results from premium to MBE comparison 
(t-statistics provided in parenthesis) 
Panel A – Results Comparison – Regression (7) 
ititititititit SURPDMBEDBEATDMBESURPERRORCAR εββββββ ++++++= *543210  
  Period  N β0 β1 β2 β3 β4 β5 R2 
Our sample 
CAR OLS 
Market Model 
(2005-
2009) 527 
-0,0184* 0,743 2,106 0,031** 0,0098 0,394 
13,07% 
(-1,865) (0,647) (0,849) (2,029) (0,788) (0,150) 
Our sample 
CAR Market 
Adjusted 
Model 
(2005-
2009) 528 
-0,035*** 0,559 2,259** 0,063*** 0,016* -0,120*** 
53,08% 
(-8,865) (0,739) (2,581) (7,683) (1,801) (-3,044) 
Bartov et 
al.(2002) 
CAR Market 
Adjusted 
Model 
(1983-
1997) 64.872 
-0,028*** 0,407*** 0,534*** 0,023*** 0,034*** 0,434*** 
8,76% 
(-27,63) (47,82) (8,15) (11,76) (16,49) (3,02) 
Panel B – Results comparison – Regression (8) 
ititititit DMBESURPERRORCAR εββββ ++++= 3210  
 Period N β0 β1 β2 β3 R
2  
Our sample 
CAR OLS Market 
Model 
(2005-
2009) 
527 
-0,017** 0,154 2,929** 0,0379*** 
12,59% 
(-2,391) (0,135) (2,047) (3,959) 
Our Sample 
CAR Market 
Adjusted Model 
(2005-
2009) 528 
-0,033*** 1,270* 1,928* 0,074*** 
51,97% (-9,327) (1,852) (1,924) (12,74) 
Dopuch et al. 
(2008). 
CAR size adjusted 
(1993-
2000) 
26.7
53 
-0,015*** 9,075*** 7,048*** 0,039*** 
7,96% 
(-6,396) (34,02) (17,92) (13,32) 
CAR is the cumulative abnormal return over the quarter beginning two days after the earliest forecast and ending the day 
following the earnings release. 
ERROR is the forecast error computed as the difference between the actual earnings and the earliest forecast for the 
quarter, EPS-FF; standardized by price at the beginning of the quarter.  
SURP is the earnings surprise computed as the difference between the actual earnings and the latest forecast for the 
quarter, EPS-LF; standardized by price at the beginning of the quarter.  
DMBE is a dummy variable that takes on the value of 1 if SURP>=0 and 0 otherwise. 
DBEAT is a dummy variable that takes on the value of 1 if SURP>0 and 0 otherwise. 
 
When, we use market adjusted abnormal return we find a higher premium than OLS 
market model, suggesting that parameters estimate on OLS market model do not entirely 
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reflect the expected return. This different could be explained to the sample chosen. Our 
sample consists in index constituents and the difference between market return and 
observed return on firm could be a better proxy to expected return. 
4.5 Market premium robustness tests 
In order to ascertain our test robustness, we perform a test based on the difference between 
CAR when expectations are met or beat and miss, similar to Bartov et al. (2002) and 
Caylor et al. (2007). Still, in this study Bartov et al. (2002) control for the forecast error 
placing firms-quarters into portfolios based on error size. However Caylor et al. (2007) 
noted that the portfolio approach has a significant disadvantage which is that it does 
control for the variation of the forecast revision and the earnings surprise within each 
portfolio. Furthermore, we do not attempt the difference between beating and merely 
meeting expectations, so we do not measure the difference of mean abnormal return 
between beat and meet. 
Results in Table 1959
                                                 
59 The tests of means comparison are showed in Appendixes D1, D2, D3, D4, D5 and D6.  
 demonstrate that, in our sample, cumulative abnormal quarterly 
return is significant higher to MBE cases. Additionally, we observe a mean abnormal 
return to firms missing the market expectations. In particular, cases with positive error that 
ends with a positive earnings surprise have an average CAR of 3,71% while those with a 
negative earnings surprise, (i.e., fail expectations) show an average CAR of -6.62%. 
Comparable results in attendance when we observe zero error signals. Contrary to 
evidenced by Bartov et al. (2002) and Caylor et al. (2007), we do not observe a negative 
mean abnormal return in cases of negative forecast error. This result is consistence with 
our regression approach, in which we do not detect a significant relevance of the earnings 
forecast error. 
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To note that expectations paths that had a positive forecast error and ends with a negative 
earnings surprise face a higher negative abnormal return (-6,62%) than paths in which it 
was a negative forecast error that ends with a negative earnings surprise (-2,03%). These 
finding are consistence with previous research that document a penalty to cases in which 
exist a negative earnings surprise. We can also intuitively conclude that the magnitude of 
the earnings surprise affect the mean quarterly abnormal returns. 
Table 19 - Mean abnormal return (CARit), measure using OLS market model, by sign of forecast error 
and expectation path 
(t-statistics provided in parenthesis) 
Error Sign N 
Expectations 
Path 
Number(a) 
Expectations 
were 
CARi,t_OLS market 
model 
(mean) 
Difference between 
CARi,t for 
Met or Beat vs Not met 
Positive 
N=268 
247 (1), (3), (4), (5) Met or Beat 0,0371 
0.0985*** 
21 (2) Not Met -0,0662 (7.053) 
Zero 
N=34 
23 (12), (13) Met or Beat 0,0110 
0,0631** 
11 (11) Not Met -0,0521 (2.292) 
Negative 
N=225 
45 (7), (9) Met or beat 0,0150 
0.0353** 
180 (6), (8), (10) Not Met -0,0203 (2.561) 
(a) Expectations paths were defined in Table 6 and draw from the sign of forecast revision and the earnings surprise. 
Table 20 - Mean abnormal return (CARit), measure using market adjusted model, by sign of forecast error 
and expectation path 
(t-statistics provided in parenthesis) 
Error Sign N 
Expectations 
Path 
Number(a) 
Expectations 
were 
CARi,t_ market 
adjusted model 
(mean) 
Difference between 
CARi,t for 
Met or Beat vs Not met 
Positive 
N=266 
244 (1), (3), (4), (5) Met or Beat 0,0571 
0,102*** 
22 (2) Not Met -0,0448 (10,064) 
Zero 
N=36 
25 (12), (13) Met or Beat 0,0297 
0,0791*** 
11 (11) Not Met -0,0494 (4.302) 
Negative 
N=226 
47 (7), (9) Met or beat 0,0511 
0.0759*** 
179 (6), (8), (10) Not Met -0,0439 (9.465) 
(a) Expectations paths were defined in Table 6 and draw from the sign of forecast revision and the earnings surprise. 
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We can withdraw similar conclusions when we measure quarterly abnormal return using 
market adjusted model (Table 20). Through all error forecast signal we observe a 
significant higher mean abnormal return in cases of MBE against cases that miss 
expectations. In particular, cases with a positive forecast error that end with a positive 
earnings surprise experience a mean quarterly abnormal return of 5,71%.  
4.6 Results for expectations management  
To infer the presence of expectations management we compare the relative frequency of 
case with negative forecasts errors and the relative frequency of negative earnings surprise. 
The results of testing H2 are provided in Table 21. The percentage of negative earnings 
surprises over the entire sample is 42,87%, which is smaller than the percentage of 
negative forecast errors, 44,57%. Still, the difference is not significant (using the test of 
proportions – Appendix E1). Similar to Bartov et al. (2002) the relative frequency of 
earnings errors is lower than relative frequency of earnings surprise, however the different 
was not significant and we can deduct expectations management from this test. 
Table 21 - Relative frequency of negative forecast errors and negative earnings surprise 
 
Negative earnings 
surprise 
Negative forecasts 
errors 
Excess of negative earnings errors over 
negative surprise cases 
 (1) (2) (3)=(2)-(1) 
Full sample 
N=636 
N % N % N % 
272 42,83% 283 44,57% 11 1,73% 
Earnings surprise is the difference between the actual earnings and the latest forecast for the quarter, EPS-LF: 
Forecast error is the difference between the actual earnings and the earliest forecast for the quarter, EPS_FF: 
The inference about the existence of expectations management is reinforced by tests of H3. 
As presented in Table 22, we determine the proportion of firm-quarters with a negative 
forecast error that end with a positive or zero surprise and the proportion of cases with a 
positive or zero forecast error that end with a negative surprise. Observations that belong to 
the first group are more likely to result from expectations management than those in the 
second group. To test H3, we examine the difference between these two proportions. As the 
table shows, 16,96% of the firm-quarters with a negative forecast error ended, nonetheless 
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(as a result of a sufficiently large downward revision in earnings forecasts), with a positive 
earnings surprise. In contrast, only 10.76% of the cases with a positive or zero forecast 
error ended (due to a downward forecast revision) with a negative earnings surprise. The 
difference, which is statistically significant, suggests the presence of expectations 
management and the rejection of H3. 
Table 22 - Expectations management: frequency of selected expectations paths by period (a) 
 
Cases likely to be affected by 
expectations management(b) 
Cases less likely to be affected by 
expectations management© 
Difference 
between the 
proportion of 
cases where 
the sign of 
the surprise 
is opposite 
the sign of 
the error 
 
 
Cases with negative forecast 
error that end with:(N=283) 
Cases with 
a positive 
earnings 
forecasts 
that end 
with a 
negative 
surprise  
(N=314) 
Cases with a 
zero forecasts 
errors that end 
with a negative 
surprise (N=39) 
Cases with 
either a 
positive or 
zero 
forecast 
error with 
a negative 
surprise 
(N=353) 
Positive 
surprise 
Zero 
suprise 
Cases with 
either 
positive or 
zero 
surprise 
N 34 14 48 26 12 38 10 
% 12,01 4,95 16,96 8,28 30,77 10,76 6,20* 
*Significant at the 1% level, using the test of proportions (appendix E2). 
(a)Expectation paths are defined by the sign of the forecast revision and the earnings surprise. The forecast revision is the 
difference between the latest forecast and the earliest forecast for the quarter, LF-FF: The earnings surprise is the 
difference between the actual earnings and the latest forecast for themquarter, EPS-LF: The forecast error is the 
difference between the actual earnings and the earliest forecast for the quarter, EPS-FF: 
(b)Defined as observations on the Down–Up or Down–Zero paths. 
©Defined as observations on the Up–Down paths. 
The findings are consistent with revisions in earnings forecasts being managed so as to 
result in MBE upon the earnings announcement. In particular, downward revisions are 
encouraged when, in their absence, the earnings surprise is expected to be negative while 
upward revisions are discouraged if they might lead to a negative earnings surprise. 
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4.7 Results for market premium as a function of management 
intervention 
In order to test hypotheses relating to management intervention (H4), we estimate 
regression (9), setting DMBEsubset equal to 1 for MBE observations that are more likely to 
represent expectations management, and 0, otherwise. In line with the analysis in previous 
section, MBE cases that are more likely than others to result from expectation management 
are identified as cases with a negative forecast error that end with a zero or positive 
earnings surprise (e.g. negative forecast error cases with Down-Zero or Down-UP paths).  
Alike with previous test we present results first with CAR obtained from the OLS market 
model and second with CAR obtained from market adjusted model. 
4.7.1  OLS market model 
Correlation  
Table 23 - Correlation matrix of variables inputs in model to test market premium as a function to 
expectations management: CAR measured by OLS market model 
 Correlations Matrix – Without OutliersN=527 
 CAR ERROR SURP DMBE DMBEsubset DMBE*
SURP 
DMBEsubset*
SURP  
CAR 
1,000 
0,296** 0,373* 0,378** 0,023 0,373** 0,025 
Sp
ea
rm
an
's 
rh
o 
co
rr
el
at
io
n 
000 000 000 0,301 000 0,287 
ERROR 0,280** 
1,000 
0,837** 0,685** -0,242** 0,799** -0,212** 
000 000 000 000 000 000 
SURP 0,360** 0,833** 
1,000 
0,850** 0,064 0,949** 0,106** 
000 000 000 0,072 000 008 
DMBE 0,367** 0,612** 0,739** 
1,000 
0,249** 0,804** 0,202** 
000 000 000 000 000 000 
DMBEsubs
et 
0,025 -0,195** 0,044 0,249** 
1,000 
-0,004 0,813** 
0,284 000 0,158 000 0,466 000 
DMBE*S
URP 
0,303** 0,751** 0,874** 0.577** -0,065 
1,000 
0,112** 
000 000 000 000 0,069 0,005 
DMBEsubs
et*SURP 
0,041 -0,158** 0,152** 0,128** 0,514** 0,160** 
1,000 
 
0,171 000 000 0,002 000 000  
 Pearson Correlation  
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level 
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We began to present a correlation matrix between variables inputs in the model (Table 23). 
We observe no statistical significant correlation between CAR and DMBEsubset , and CAR 
and DMBEsubset*SURP. From the correlation matrix table we could observe a negative 
correlation between ERROR and DMBEsubset and also with DMBEsubset*SURP. These 
results suggest that variables vary in opposite directions. 
Results from the multicollinearity test show VIF values varies from 6,585 (SURP) to 1,326 
(DMBEsubset) validating our regression. 
Regression results 
Similar to the previous results presented here we perform tests to infer the 
heterocedasticity in the estimation and also the improved estimation model. We also 
present results from estimation of regression (9), with outliers in Appendix F1. 
The results of the test of the association between expectations management and the 
premium (H4) are provided in Table 24. If investors detect expectations management and 
further, do not assign a premium or assign a lower premium to these cases (i.e., rejection of 
hypothesis 4), the coefficients δ4 and δ6 are expected to be negative. Although the 
coefficients are negative, they are not significant and therefore do not allow assuming 
conclusions about the association between premium to MBE and the expectations 
management.  
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Table 24 - Association between the premium to MBE and expectations management: results from the 
estimation of regression (9) using CAR measured by OLS market model 
(t-statistics provided in parenthesis) 
itit
subset
it
it
subset
ititititit
SURPDMBE
SURPDMBEDMBEDMBESURPERRORCAR
εδ
δδδδδδ
+
++++++=
*
*
6
543210
 
Dependent Variable: CARi,t OLS Market Model 
Without Outliers N=527 
 
δ0 δ1 δ2 δ3 δ4 δ5 δ6 R2 
Coeficients -0,017** -2,089* 4,673*** 0,040*** -0,018 0,303 -2.333 
15,78% 
t-statistc (-2,161) (-1,760) (2,928) (3,712) (-1,171) (0,154) (-0.476) 
White test  Chi2 (15)=26,8042 Prob>Chi2=0,0304 
Breusch-
Pagan 
 
Chi2 (1)=0,00065  Prob>Chi2=0,9797 
Hausman  Chi2 (5)= 5,68367 Prob>Chi2=0,45954 
Test F  F (45, 473)  =  1,03512   Prob > F =  0,4138 
 Heterocedasticity Adjusted 
Coeficients -0,018* 0,231 2,401 0,040*** -0,011 0,801 -0.105 
13,54% 
t-statistc (-1,815) (0,160) (0,905) (3,562) (-0,802) (0,299) (-0,036) 
CARQ is the cumulative abnormal return over the period beginning two days following the first forecast and ending 1 
day following the earnings release. 
ERROR is the forecast error computed as the difference between the actual earnings and the earliest forecast for the 
quarter, EPS_FF; standardized by price at the beginning of the quarter. 
SURP is the earnings surprise computed as the difference between the actual earnings and the latest forecast for the 
quarter, EPS_LF; standardized by price at the beginning of the quarter. 
DMBE is a dummy variable that takes on the value of 1 if SURP>^=0 and 0 otherwise. 
DMBEsubset is a dummy variable that takes on the value 1 if SURP>=0 and the observation belongs to the designated 
subset of the sample; otherwise DMBEsubset=0. 
4.7.2 Market adjusted model 
Correlation 
We present correlation matrix of variables inputs in the model using CAR measure with 
market adjusted abnormal return. We find similar results provide in the previous Table 25. 
Variable DMBE*SURP and CAR_ma are negatively correlated. We also find no 
significant correlations between CAR_ma and DMBEsubset*SURP, and between 
DMBE*SURP and ERROR, SURP, DMBE and DMBEsubset*SURP. 
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Table 25 - Correlation matrix of variables inputs in model to test market premium as a function to 
expectations management: CAR measured by market adjusted model 
 Correlations Matrix – Without Outliers N=528 
 CAR_m
a 
ERROR SURP DMBE DMBEsubset DMBE*
SURP 
DMBEsubset*
SURP  
CAR_ma 1,000 0,607** 0,718* 0,763** 0,090* 0,677** 0,116** 
Sp
ea
rm
an
's 
rh
o 
co
rr
el
at
io
n 
000 000 000 0,019 000 0.004 
ERROR 0,520** 1,000 0,827** 0,677** -0,247** 0,784** -0,217** 
000 000 000 000 000 000 
SURP 0,614** 0,823** 1,000 0,849** 0,070 0,946** 0,113** 
000 000 000 0,053 000 005 
DMBE 0,708** 0,603** 0,733** 1,000 0,257** 0,798** 0,212** 
000 000 000 000 000 000 
DMBEsubs
et 
0,089* -0,196** 0,046* 0,257** 1,000 0,005 0,825** 
0,020 000 0,146 000 0,454 000 
DMBE*S
URP 
-0,072* 0,049 0,061 -0.012 -0,018 1,000 0,117** 
0,049 0,132 0,080 0,395 0,338 0,003 
DMBEsubs
et*SURP 
0,070 -0,163** 0,154** 0,134** 0,522** 0,004 1,000  
0,054 000 000 0,001 000 0,459  
 Pearson Correlation  
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level 
Results from the multicollinearity test show VIF with values from 5,344 (SURP) to 1,011 
(DMBE*SURP) validating regression estimation. 
Regression results 
Now we present results of testing the premium of MBE as a function of expectations 
management. Specifically, we intend to test if investors assign a smaller premium in cases 
which is more likely that MBE was achieved by expectations management. To that matter 
we estimate the regression (9).  
The results of the test of the association between expectations management and the 
premium (H4) are provided Table 26. The estimation of the full sample is present in 
Appendix F2. 
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Table 26 - Association between the premium to MBE and expectations management: results from the 
estimation of regression (9) using CAR measured by market adjusted model 
(t-statistics provided in parenthesis) 
 
itit
subset
it
it
subset
ititititit
SURPDMBE
SURPDMBEDMBEDMBESURPERRORCAR
εδ
δδδδδδ
++
+++++=
*
*
6
543210   
Dependent Variable: CARi,t Market Adjusted  Model 
Without outliers  N=528 
 
δ0 δ1 δ2 δ3 δ4 δ5 δ6 R2 
Coeficients -0,034*** -0,128 2,917*** 0,079*** -0,017* -0,121*** -0,297 
53,18% 
t-statistc (-8,837) (-0,158) (2,873) (12,112) (-1,881) (-2,979) (-0,096) 
White test  Chi2 (15)=22,779 Prob>Chi2=0,1198 
Breusch-
Pagan 
 
Chi2 (1)=0,17844  Prob>Chi2=0,67272 
Hausman  Chi2 (5)= 3,48403 Prob>Chi2=0,746093 
Test F  F (45, 476)  =  1,20024   Prob > F =  0,18194 
CARQ is the cumulative abnormal return over the period beginning two days following the first forecast and ending 1 
day following the earnings release. 
ERROR is the forecast error computed as the difference between the actual earnings and the earliest forecast for the 
quarter, EPS_FF; standardized by price at the beginning of the quarter. 
SURP is the earnings surprise computed as the difference between the actual earnings and the latest forecast for the 
quarter, EPS_LF; standardized by price at the beginning of the quarter. 
DMBE is a dummy variable that takes on the value of 1 if SURP>=0 and 0 otherwise.  
DMBEsubset is a dummy variable that takes on the value 1 if SURP>=0 and the observation belongs to the designated 
subset of the sample; otherwise DMBEsubset=0. 
The coefficients δ4 are negative and mostly significant. This result suggests that the 
premium to MBE is lower in instances in which the MBE is more likely to have been 
driven by expectations management. Overall, however, the premium to MBE in these cases 
still exists and is lower by only a small amount as compared with the premium to MBE in 
other cases. This is evident from the small negative coefficient for DMBEsubset, δ4 (-0.017), 
which is the conditional intercept dummy, relative to the coefficient for DMBE, δ3 (0,079) 
the unconditional intercept dummy. We do not experience a coefficient δ6 statically 
significant, which conditions our inferences between the expectations management and the 
premium to MBE. 
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4.8 Conclusion  
In this chapter the results of our empirical work has been presented. We exhibited results 
from the existence of a market reward to firms that meet or beat analysts’ forecasts, the 
presence of expectations management and the association between the market premium 
and the intervention of the management through expectations guidance. From the analysis 
we outline the diminishing of MBE cases in the last two years of our sample period. The 
decrease could be due to economic variables of the years, especially in 2008 when capital 
markets experience a prices downfall. 
We became aware of the existence of a market premium to firms that meet or beat 
expectations. This result was more evident when we perform the dependent variable, CAR, 
by market adjusted model. We also infer from the existence of expectations management to 
firms quarters presented in our sample. 
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Chapter 5  Conclusions 
Chapter 5 
Conclusions 
The present work examines in which instances the expectations game was played by 
managers and investors in the DJ Stoxx 50 E Index. In particular, we focus on the level to 
which reported earnings meet or beat analysts’ forecasts. Although some individual 
conclusions had already been reported throughout and in the end of the previous chapter, 
we will now summarize in the following the most important results of this work. 
Relatively to the evolution of the cases of MBE in the period of the study (2005-2009), 
results allow us to report a decrease in MBE cases in the year of 2008. In particular, the 
MBE cases go from a relative frequency of 65% in 2007 to 45% in 2008. In addition, the 
year of 2008 presents a higher relative frequency of failures to MBE than cases of positive 
earnings surprises. Consistent with previous research, we observe a decreasing in MBE 
cases in all fiscal quarters (fourth quarter), relatively to the others quarters in the year. The 
conclusion leads to the heaviness of taxes and the firms attempt to reduce fiscal taxes. 
Although this conclusions, we cannot draw a trend in cases of MBE, because of the limited 
period of the study. 
Another objective of the study was to test the existence of a market premium to firms that 
meet or beat analysts’ forecasts. Consistent with previous research we found a market 
premium to firms that meet or beat expectations, proxied by analysts’ forecasts. Our 
findings show a quarterly abnormal return to firms that meet or beat expectations, 
proximally 3,9% above other firms. We also concluded that the magnitude of the earnings 
surprise affect the reaction of the market, suggesting that investors attach a relevance to the 
earnings surprise and reward the firms that report earnings above market expectations. Our 
findings show that cases with a positive forecast error that end with a negative earnings 
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surprise experience a lower premium that cases with negative or zero forecast error that 
ends with a negative earnings surprise, according to the investors surprise hypothesis. 
We also draw from the results that the earnings forecast error does not affect significantly 
the abnormal return of the quarter. This finding is reinforced in our robustness tests in 
which we do not find a negative mean quarterly abnormal return to negative forecasts 
errors cases. 
Although is not formally hypothesized, we also conclude that a higher reward is associated 
with beating expectations than merely meeting expectations. Contradictory to the findings 
in previous research, we do not find a magnitude of the penalty from missing expectations 
lower than the premium to meet or beat expectations. 
The results also predict that the measure of cumulative abnormal return by market adjusted 
model increases consistency in our results, which suggests that the market return was an 
accurate proxy to expected return, especially because we delimitate our sample to a market 
index constituents.  
Another objective of this research was to test the presence of expectations management. 
Thereunto, we observe the expectations paths during the quarter. A negative forecast error 
that ends with a positive earnings surprise is consistent with expectations management, 
especially because it is due to a sufficiently downward revision of the forecast in the 
interim period. The results suggest that cases with the likelihood of expectations 
management are significantly higher than cases less likely to be affected by expectations 
management.  
Results from the association between the market premium and the integration of the 
management through expectations management suggests that the market premium still 
exist when the MBE is likely to be achieved by expectations management. However, the 
premium in these cases is lower than in cases in which MBE was genuine. The findings 
show that investors are not able to discern the expectations management and assign a 
market premium in cases in which MBE is achieved through expectations management. 
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Results also predict that investors understand the MBE as a signal of firm future 
performance and they do not distinguish cases in which MBE is not genuine.  
These finding corrugate with the vast literature enhanced the market incentive to managers 
report earnings that are similar or above the market expectations. The results postulate the 
hypothesis that market is inefficiency and do not adjust to new information. In a topic of 
efficient market the earning surprise do not affect the quarterly abnormal return. The 
results allow us to conclude that investors overreact to earnings surprise and therefore are 
not rational.  
This work has several limitations. The first limitation of this study was the size of the 
sample. Prior research was based in a very large number of observations relatively to our 
sample, which can bring heterocedasticity problems to ours estimations and unbiased 
results. In future research we intend to extend the analysis to a larger number of firms and 
through a longer period. Specially, we consider that it is pertinent to examine the role of 
financial numbers game in a Portuguese context. However, Portuguese market is not very 
attractive and therefore not usually coverage by analysts, which increases difficulties to the 
compilation of data. 
Financial numbers game was defined as the actions that managers take to report earnings 
similar or above the market expectations. The mechanisms that managers could employ are 
downward guidance and earnings management. Another limitation of this work is to 
restrain the analysis to expectations management and do not test for earnings management. 
A pertinent research question for future research is to test earnings management in the 
sample.  
We also can retain another limitation of this study, which is the weakness of the tests for 
the presence of expectations management. To that matter, we intend to reinforce our results 
using another model to infer expectations management. Specially, a model in which 
guidance is the unexpected portion of consensus analyst forecast. 
Relatively to the inferences about the association between the market premium and the 
presence of expectations management, we also pull out a limitation in the CAR 
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accumulation period. If the market reacts slowly to new information, investors could 
percept the expectation management late in the quarter. In order to strengthen our results 
we should extend the period of accumulation to a longer period after the earnings release. 
An important area that further work is needed is the attempt to provide explanation to one 
of our achievements, which is the higher magnitude of the penalty for case that miss 
expectations than the magnitude of the premium to cases which expectations are met or 
beat. In a previous analysis, we can draw an explanation based on investor’s cognitive bias. 
An attempt to future research is to isolate the disclosures about earnings from those that are 
not about earnings, like dividends. The cumulative abnormal return of the quarter could be 
affected by other events not related to the earnings. Intercept coefficient in ours regressions 
is significant, which indicates that there are other explanations to the return of the quarter. 
Finally, we believe that our results might be of interest to academics, managers and market 
participants. Firm managers could be interested in this study because they can guide 
disclosure strategy inside the firm and became conscious of the market reward to MBE. 
Researches could be interested in this study because it provides evidence of the market 
premium in a specific market index. Market participants, analysts and investors, could 
have interest in this work, because it makes them aware of the game played by firms in 
order to experience a higher quarterly return. 
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Appendix A - DJ Stoxx constituints 
DJ Stoxx Constituints 
Number Company Market Weight (%) 
Market 
Capitalization 
(EUR Bil.) 
Sector 
1 AB INBEV BRU 1,7 26,41 BEVERAGES 
2 AEGON AEX 0,53 8,24 LIFE INSURANCE 
3 AIR LIQUIDE PAR 1,49 23,17 CHEMICALS 
4 ALLIANZ SE GER 2,51 39,14 NONLIFE INSURANCE 
5 ALSTOM PAR 0,58 9 INDUSTRIAL ENGINEERING 
6 ARCELORMITTAL AEX 1,76 27,4 INDUSTRIAL METALS & MINING 
7 AXA PAR 1,77 27,64 NONLIFE INSURANCE 
8 BANCO SANTANDER MCE 5 77,89 BANKS 
9 BASF SE GER 2,59 40,42 CHEMICALS 
10 BAYER N AG GER 2,55 39,76 CHEMICALS 
11 BBVA MCE 2,39 37,27 BANKS 
12 BNP PARIBAS PAR 3,3 51,41 BANKS 
13 CARREFOUR PAR 1,44 22,45 FOOD & DRUG RETAILERS 
14 CREDIT AGRICOLE PAR 0,73 11,43 BANKS 
15 CRH PLC ISE 0,97 15,1 CONSTRUCTION & MATERIALS 
16 DAIMLER AG N GER 2,22 34,6 AUTOMOBILES & PARTS 
17 DANONE PAR 1,75 27,19 FOOD PRODUCERS 
18 DEUTSCHE BANK N GER 2,08 32,45 BANKS 
19 DT BOERSE N GER 0,73 11,42 FINANCIAL SERVICES 
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Number Company Market Weight (%) 
Market 
Capitalization 
(EUR Bil.) 
Sector 
20 DT TELEKOM N GER 1,87 29,13 MOBILE TELECOMMUNICATIONS 
21 E.ON  AG NA GER 3,57 55,55 GAS, WATER & MULTI-UTILITIES 
22 ENEL MIL 1,62 25,19 ELECTRICITY 
23 ENI MIL 2,64 41,09 OIL & GAS PRODUCERS 
24 FRANCE TELECOM PAR 2,01 31,39 FIXED LINE TELECOMMUNICATIONS 
25 GDF SUEZ PAR 2,29 35,71 GAS, WATER & MULTI-UTILITIES 
26 GENERALI ASS MIL 1,37 21,31 NONLIFE INSURANCE 
27 IBERDROLA MCE 1,5 23,43 ELECTRICITY 
28 ING GROEP AEX 1,67 26,03 LIFE INSURANCE 
29 INTESA SANPAOLO MIL 1,54 24,05 BANKS 
30 L OREAL PAR 1,2 18,67 PERSONAL GOODS 
31 L.V.M.H. PAR 1,44 22,37 PERSONAL GOODS 
32 MUENCH. RUECK N GER 1,28 19,89 NONLIFE INSURANCE 
33 NOKIA HEX 2,2 34,29 TECHNOLOGY HARDWARE & EQUIPMENT 
34 PHILIPS KON AEX 1,59 24,73 LEISURE GOODS 
35 REPSOL YPF MCE 0,9 14,02 OIL & GAS PRODUCERS 
36 RWE AG GER 1,64 25,58 GAS, WATER & MULTI-UTILITIES 
37 SAINT-GOBAIN PAR 1,01 15,68 CONSTRUCTION & MATERIALS 
38 SANOFI-AVENTIS PAR 3,65 56,85 PHARMACEUTICALS & BIOTECHNOLOGY 
39 SAP AG GER 2,07 32,23 SOFTWARE & COMPUTER SERVICES 
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Number Company Market Weight (%) 
Market 
Capitalization 
(EUR Bil.) 
Sector 
40 SCHNEIDER ELECTR PAR 1,45 22,53 ELECTRONIC & ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT 
41 SIEMENS N GER 4,12 64,17 GENERAL INDUSTRIALS 
42 SOCIETE GENERALE PAR 1,92 29,89 BANKS 
43 TELECOM ITALIA MIL 0,7 10,93 FIXED LINE TELECOMMUNICATIONS 
44 TELEFONICA MCE 40048 69,85 FIXED LINE TELECOMMUNICATIONS 
45 TOTAL PAR 5,75 89,62 OIL & GAS PRODUCERS 
46 UNIBAIL RODAMCO PAR 0,83 13 REAL ESTATE INVESTMENT TRUSTS 
47 UNICREDIT MIL 2,34 36,49 BANKS 
48 UNILEVER CERT AEX 2,29 35,7 FOOD PRODUCERS 
49 VINCI PAR 1,41 22,03 CONSTRUCTION & MATERIALS 
50 VIVENDI PAR 1,56 24,23 MEDIA 
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Appendix B - Panel data and estimation methods 
Panel data aggregate two forms of data, cross-sectional and times-series data. The panel 
models make a quantitative analysis of economic relations, gathering temporal data (time-
series) and sectional (cross-section) in the same model called pooled. When the temporal 
data is not the same in all individuals, we use an unbalanced panel. As analysts have more 
interest in one firm than another, in the period of our sample, there are missing firms-
quarter observations. This scenario leads to an unbalanced or incomplete panel. With panel 
data we can explore simultaneous variables variation across time between different 
individuals. This combination technique of time-series with cross-sectional allows a 
complete and efficient panel model estimation. 
According to Baltagi (2001), panel data offers several advantages over cross-sectional and 
time-series models, controlling for individual heterocedasticity. Panel data also give the 
researcher a large number of observations, increasing the degree of freedom and reducing 
the collinearity among explanatory variables due the different individuals’ structures, 
hence improving the efficiency of econometric estimates. More important, panel data 
allows the researcher to analyze important economic questions that cannot be addressed 
using cross-sectional or time-series data sets, because estimation efficiency and stability. 
Panel models also allow the researcher to choose between efficient estimations and to 
perform dynamic adjustments, not possible in cross-section models. However, panel 
models offer two significant disadvantages. The first is related with heterocedasticity bias 
and the second results from the sample individuals’ selectivity bias.  
According to Baltagi (2001), panel general model is given by the follow equation, 
 TtNiuXXy itkitkititititit ,...,1,,...,1,...110 ==++++= βββ  (10) 
where i denotes the individuals and t denotes time. β0it is an intercept term, and each βkit  is 
the coefficient of the Xkit explanatory variable. 
Most of the panel data applications utilize a one-way component model for the 
disturbances, with 
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 itititu υµ +=  (11) 
where itµ denotes the unobservable individual specific effect and itυ  denotes the remainder 
disturbance. 
The three static estimation models used in panel data are: pooled OLS, fixed effects and 
random effects. 
Pooled OLS model assume that β0it is identical to all individuals and remains constant over 
time. It is the simplest specification, but the most unrealistic one, because of the 
assumption that the behavior is equal to all individuals over time. The model also predicts 
that all observations are homogeneous. The model can be estimated with OLS application 
to the observations, since linear regression classic hypotheses are fulfilled. In this model it 
is admitted that μit  is “white noise” and  Cov (Xit , μit)=0. 
This method is appropriate to previous selected individuals which present similar 
characteristics. However, this estimation method is not usually considered as a panel model 
due to the possible heterocedasticity and the subsequent bias. Alternative pooled models 
introduce individuals’ heterocedasticity in a fixed way (fixed effects) or in a random way 
(random effects). 
Fixed effects model is used to combine the parsimony of heterocedasticity and 
independence. The model predicts that individuals’ heterocedasticity can be captured in the 
intercept term, which is different to each individual. The observations homogeneity 
hypothesis was present because the model assumes that slope coefficients are identical to 
all individuals. 
To estimate the model LSDV (Least Squares Dummy Variable) is used, consisting in 
introducing dummy variables to capture heterocedasticity between individuals. We can 
distinguish three particular cases. We can use dummy variables in individuals, in period, or 
both. The method with individual dummies is more usual, since it captures 
heterocedasticity between individuals. One of the disadvantages of the model with 
individual dummies (when there is a large number of individuals), is the estimation of 
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many parameters and the consequent loss of degrees of freedom. However, estimators are 
BLUE (Best Linear Unbiased Estimator) because they have minimum variance, since 
perturbations follow consistent classic hypotheses when N→ ∞  and  T→ ∞. 
In order to test if model assumptions are appropriated, it is advisable to do a test to verify if 
intercept terms are different among individuals. The hypotheses are: 
 H0: β01= β02 = … =  β0k 
 H1:  β01 ≠ β02 ≠… ≠  β0k 
This hypothesis is tested with statistical F60
In the random effects model the estimation assumes that individuals’ heterocedasticity is 
present in the residual term. The model predicts that β0 is not fixed but is an unobservable 
random parameter.  
. Under the null hypothesis, intercepts are equal 
to all individuals.  
It is assumed that error terms are homoscedastics and uncorrelated. The hypothesis that 
error term and explanatory variables are uncorrelated is crucial to obtain unbiased and 
consistent estimators. All individuals have common components which create error 
autocorrelation in each individual (within-unit autocorrelation) causing inefficient OLS 
estimators and invalid standard deviation. The solution is to estimate the random effects 
model with GLS (Generalized Least Squares) to obtain efficient estimators. 
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To test if random effects model is appropriate, we perform Breusch-Pagan test61
 H0:
 based in 
Lagrange multiplicator. The test hypotheses are: 
02 =υσ  
 H1: 02 ≠υσ  
Under the null hypothesis62
To ascertain if random effects models improve estimation relatively to fixed effects model 
we perform Hausman test. The null hypothesis represents random effects model assuming 
that there is no correlation between the unobservable fixed effects and explanatory 
variables. The hypotheses to test are: 
, the fixed effects model is a more appropriate model than 
random effects model. 
 ( ) 0,:0 =iti XCovH υ  
 ( ) 0,:1 ≠iti XCovH υ  
Under the null hypothesis the random effects model (GLS estimation) estimators are 
efficient and consistent. If H > 2kχ  or p-value < 0.05, reject random effects model and 
assume fixed effects model. 
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62 Under the null hypothesis, LM had χ2 distribution with a degree of freedom. 
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According to Marques (2000), the choice between fixed or random effects model should be 
based in the purpose of the research and data context. Therefore, if we pretend, through a 
random sample, infer relatively to a population, random effects model is appropriate. Our 
research intends to infer the behavior of a concrete individual, so the most obvious choice 
is fixed effect model. However, to ascertain if the influence of individuals in our sample in 
constant term, we estimate our models using pooled OLS assuming homogeneity, α 
constant. Then we perform tests F, Breusch-Pagan and Hausman to choose between the 
estimation method that give more consistent and efficient estimators. 
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Appendix C - Tests from market premium – Full 
sample 
Appendix C1 – Results from regression (7) using full sample: CAR measured by 
OLS market model. 
This appendix presents the estimation results of regression (7), measuring CAR thought OLS market model 
and using the full sample. 
Table 27 - Premium to MB: results from the estimation of regression (7) using CAR measured by OLS 
Market Model – Full sample 
(t-statistics provided in parenthesis) 
ititititititit SURPDMBEDBEATDMBESURPERRORCAR εββββββ ++++++= *543210   
Dependent Variable: CARi,t OLS Market Model 
Full sample N=632 
 
β0 β1 β2 β3 β4 β5 R2 
Coeficients -0,0273*** 0,371 1,139* 0,0443** 0,016 0,025 
20,17% 
t-statistc (-4,06) (0,682) (1,91) (2,072) (0,722) (0,0416) 
White test Chi2 (1)=40,7155  Prob>Chi2=0,000 
Breusch-Pagan Chi2 (1)=0,00983  Prob>Chi2=0,92102 
Hausman Chi2 (1)=3,47228  Prob>Chi2=0,627586 
Test F F (45, 474)  =  0,996441   Prob > F =  0,482158 
Heterocedasticity Adjusted 
Coeficients -0,0233*** 0,407 1,377 0,0403** 0,0095 0,9002 
14,43% 
t-statistc (-3,014) (0,525) (1,300) (2,502) (0,624) (0,9598) 
CAR is the cumulative abnormal return over the quarter beginning two days after the earliest forecast and ending the day 
following the earnings release. 
ERROR is the forecast error computed as the difference between the actual earnings and the earliest forecast for the 
quarter, EPS-FF; standardized by price at the beginning of the quarter. 
SURP is the earnings surprise computed as the difference between the actual earnings and the latest forecast for the 
quarter, EPS-LF; standardized by price at the beginning of the quarter. 
DMBE is a dummy variable that takes on the value of 1 if SURP>=0 and 0 otherwise. 
DBEAT is a dummy variable that takes on the value of 1 if SURP>0 and 0 otherwise. 
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Appendix C2 - Results from regression (8) using full sample: CAR measured by 
OLS market model 
This appendix presents the estimation results of regression (8), measuring CAR thought OLS market model 
and using the full sample. 
 
Table 28 - Premium to MBE: results from the estimation of regression (8) using CAR measured by OLS 
Market Model – Full sample 
(t-statistics provided in parenthesis) 
ititititit DMBESURPERRORCAR εββββ ++++= 3210  
Dependent Variable: CARi,Q OLS Market Model 
Full sample N=632 
  β0 β1 β2 β3 R2 
Coeficients -0,027*** 0,376 1,159** 0,058*** 
20,05% 
t-statistc (-4,271) (0,761) (2,145) (6,752) 
White test Chi2 (1)=33,129 Prob>Chi2=0,000 
Breusch-Pagan test Chi2 (1)=0,17795  Prob>Chi2=0,67313 
Hausman test Chi2 (1)=2,87262  Prob>Chi2=0,411684 
Test F F (45, 583)  =  0,940265   Prob > F =  0,5855 
Heterocedasticity Adjusted 
Coeficients -0,0257*** 0,141 1,488* 0,0563*** 
14,68% 
t-statistc (-3,2872) (0,192) (1,757) (5,785) 
CAR is the cumulative abnormal return over the quarter beginning two days after the earliest forecast and ending the day 
following the earnings release. 
ERROR is the forecast error computed as the difference between the actual earnings and the earliest forecast for the 
quarter, EPS-FF; standardized by price at the beginning of the quarter. 
SURP is the earnings surprise computed as the difference between the actual earnings and the latest forecast for the 
quarter, EPS-LF; standardized by price at the beginning of the quarter. 
DMBE is a dummy variable that takes on the value of 1 if SURP>=0 and 0 otherwise. 
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Appendix C3 - Results from regression (7) using full sample: CAR measured by 
market adjusted model 
This appendix presents the estimation results of regression (7), measuring CAR thought market adjusted 
model and using the full sample. 
 
Table 29 - Premium to MBE: results from the estimation of regression (7) using CAR measured by market 
adjusted model – Full Sample 
(t-statistics provided in parenthesis) 
ititititititit SURPDMBEDBEATDMBESURPERRORCAR εββββββ ++++++= *543210   
Dependent Variable: CARi,t Market Adjusted  Model 
Full sample N=636 
 
β0 β1 β2 β3 β4 β5 R2 
Coeficients -0,053*** 0,651 1,461*** 0,097*** 0,006 -0,127 
51,84% 
t-statistc (-10,929) (1,339) (2,684) (6,633) (0,385) (-1,157) 
White test Chi2 (14)=35,251 Prob>Chi2=0,0013 
Breusch-Pagan Chi2 (1)=0,0097  Prob>Chi2=0,9214 
Hausman Chi2 (5)= 11,0327 Prob>Chi2=0,0507 
Test F F (45, 585)  =  0,975228   Prob > F =  0,52052 
Heterocedasticity Adjusted 
Coeficients -0,044*** 1,216** 1,658** 0,089*** 0,004 -0,117* 
48,07% 
t-statistc (-9,583) (1,977) (2,207) (7,576) (0,339) (-1,826) 
CAR is the cumulative abnormal return over the quarter beginning two days after the earliest forecast and ending the day 
following the earnings release. 
ERROR is the forecast error computed as the difference between the actual earnings and the earliest forecast for the 
quarter, EPS-FF; standardized by price at the beginning of the quarter. 
SURP is the earnings surprise computed as the difference between the actual earnings and the latest forecast for the 
quarter, EPS-LF; standardized by price at the beginning of the quarter. 
DMBE is a dummy variable that takes on the value of 1 if SURP>=0 and 0 otherwise. 
DBEAT is a dummy variable that takes on the value of 1 if SURP>0 and 0 otherwise. 
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Appendix C4 - Results from regression (8) using full sample: CAR measured by 
market adjusted model 
This appendix presents the estimation results of regression (8), measuring CAR through market adjusted 
model and using the full sample. 
 
Table 30 - Premium to MBE: results from the estimation of regression (8) using CAR measured by market 
adjusted model –Full sample 
(t-statistics provided in parenthesis) 
ititititit DMBESURPERRORCAR εββββ ++++= 3210  
Dependent Variable: CARit, Market Adjusted Model 
Full sample N=636 
  β0 β1 β2 β3 R2 
Coeficients -0,054*** 0,647* 1,441*** 0,103*** 
51,59% 
t-statistc (-11,151) (1,713) (3,486) (15,666) 
White test Chi2 (9)=31,394 Prob>Chi2=0,000 
Breusch-Pagan test Chi2 (1)=0,0564  Prob>Chi2=0,812 
Hausman test Chi2 (3)=5,9415  Prob>Chi2=0,11445 
Test F F (45, 587)  =  1,0025   Prob > F =  0,47057 
Heterocedasticity Adjusted 
Coeficients -0,048*** 1,288** 1,438** 0,095*** 
49,57% 
t-statistc (-9,478) (2,333) (2,284) (13,88) 
CAR is the cumulative abnormal return over the quarter beginning two days after the earliest forecast and ending the day 
following the earnings release. 
ERROR is the forecast error computed as the difference between the actual earnings and the earliest forecast for the 
quarter, EPS-FF; standardized by price at the beginning of the quarter. 
SURP is the earnings surprise computed as the difference between the actual earnings and the latest forecast for the 
quarter, EPS-LF; standardized by price at the beginning of the quarter. 
DMBE is a dummy variable that takes on the value of 1 if SURP>=0 and 0 otherwise. 
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Appendix D - SPSS outputs – Comparison of means 
Appendix D1 – SPSS outputs from the tests of comparison of CAR mean: 
ERROR positive and CAR measured by OLS market model. 
Tests of compare quarterly abnormal returns means using OLS market model, in paths with positive earnings 
forecast error. 
T-Test 
Group Statistics 
 SURP N Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error Mean 
CAR >= ,00000 247 ,0370743 ,06018950 ,00383754 
< ,00000 21 -,0614563 ,07520068 ,01641013 
 
 
Independent Samples Test 
 
Levene's Test for Equality of 
Variances t-test for Equality of Means 
F Sig. t df 
CAR Equal variances assumed 1,102 ,295 7,053 265 
Equal variances not 
assumed   
5,847 22,242 
 
Independent Samples Test 
 
t-test for Equality of Means 
Sig. (2-tailed) 
Mean 
Difference 
Std. Error 
Difference 
CAR Equal variances assumed ,000 ,09853064 ,01397024 
Equal variances not 
assumed 
,000 ,09853064 ,01685287 
 
Independent Samples Test 
 
t-test for Equality of Means 
95% Confidence Interval of the 
Difference 
Lower Upper 
CAR Equal variances assumed ,07102385 ,12603742 
Equal variances not 
assumed 
,06360194 ,13345933 
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Appendix D2 - SPSS outputs from the tests of comparison of CAR mean: ERROR 
zero and CAR measured by OLS market model. 
 
Tests of compare quarterly abnormal returns means using OLS market model, in paths with zero earnings 
forecast error. 
T-Test 
Group Statistics 
 SURP N Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error Mean 
CAR >= ,00000 23 ,0110060 ,07241111 ,01509876 
< ,00000 11 -,0521362 ,08087217 ,02438388 
 
 
Independent Samples Test 
 
Levene's Test for Equality of 
Variances t-test for Equality of Means 
F Sig. t df 
CAR Equal variances assumed ,159 ,692 2,292 32 
Equal variances not 
assumed   
2,202 17,940 
 
Independent Samples Test 
 
t-test for Equality of Means 
Sig. (2-tailed) 
Mean 
Difference 
Std. Error 
Difference 
CAR Equal variances assumed ,029 ,06314214 ,02755193 
Equal variances not 
assumed 
,041 ,06314214 ,02868006 
 
Independent Samples Test 
 
t-test for Equality of Means 
95% Confidence Interval of the 
Difference 
Lower Upper 
CAR Equal variances assumed ,00702069 ,11926358 
Equal variances not 
assumed 
,00287306 ,12341122 
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Appendix D3 - SPSS outputs from the tests of comparison of CAR mean: ERROR 
negative and CAR measured by OLS market model. 
Tests of compare quarterly abnormal returns means using OLS market model, in paths with negative 
earnings forecast error. 
T-Test 
 
Group Statistics 
 SURP N Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error Mean 
CAR >= ,00000 45 ,0150060 ,06641252 ,01001206 
< ,00000 180 -,0203014 ,08528616 ,00635686 
 
 
Independent Samples Test 
 
Levene's Test for Equality of 
Variances t-test for Equality of Means 
F Sig. t df 
CAR Equal variances assumed 3,095 ,080 2,561 222 
Equal variances not 
assumed   
2,977 81,476 
 
Independent Samples Test 
 
t-test for Equality of Means 
Sig. (2-tailed) 
Mean 
Difference 
Std. Error 
Difference 
CAR Equal variances assumed ,011 ,03530742 ,01378539 
Equal variances not 
assumed 
,004 ,03530742 ,01185964 
 
Independent Samples Test 
 
t-test for Equality of Means 
95% Confidence Interval of the 
Difference 
Lower Upper 
CAR Equal variances assumed ,00814045 ,06247439 
Equal variances not 
assumed 
,01171255 ,05890229 
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Appendix D4 - SPSS outputs from the tests of comparison of CAR mean: ERROR 
positive and CAR measured by market adjusted model. 
Tests of compare quarterly abnormal returns means using market adjusted model, in paths with positive 
earnings forecast error. 
T-Test 
 
Group Statistics 
 SURP N Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error Mean 
CAR_MA
M 
>= ,00000 244 ,0571375 ,04470138 ,00286171 
< ,00000 22 -,0448270 ,05402273 ,01151768 
 
 
Independent Samples Test 
 
Levene's Test for Equality of 
Variances t-test for Equality of Means 
F Sig. t df 
CAR_MA
M 
Equal variances assumed 1,946 ,164 10,064 264 
Equal variances not 
assumed   
8,592 23,665 
 
Independent Samples Test 
 
t-test for Equality of Means 
Sig. (2-tailed) 
Mean 
Difference 
Std. Error 
Difference 
CAR_MA
M 
Equal variances assumed ,000 ,10196452 ,01013137 
Equal variances not 
assumed 
,000 ,10196452 ,01186787 
 
Independent Samples Test 
 
t-test for Equality of Means 
95% Confidence Interval of the 
Difference 
Lower Upper 
CAR_MA
M 
Equal variances assumed ,08201596 ,12191309 
Equal variances not 
assumed 
,07745208 ,12647697 
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Appendix D5 - SPSS outputs from the tests of comparison of CAR mean: ERROR 
zero and CAR measured by market adjusted model. 
Tests of compare quarterly abnormal returns means using market adjusted model, in paths with zero 
earnings forecast error. 
T-Test 
 
Group Statistics 
 SURP N Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error Mean 
CAR_MA
M 
>= ,00000 25 ,0296584 ,05365695 ,01073139 
< ,00000 11 -,0494317 ,04321393 ,01302949 
 
 
Independent Samples Test 
 
Levene's Test for Equality of 
Variances t-test for Equality of Means 
F Sig. t df 
CAR_MA
M 
Equal variances assumed ,226 ,637 4,302 34 
Equal variances not 
assumed   
4,685 23,637 
 
Independent Samples Test 
 
t-test for Equality of Means 
Sig. (2-tailed) 
Mean 
Difference 
Std. Error 
Difference 
CAR_MA
M 
Equal variances assumed ,000 ,07909017 ,01838331 
Equal variances not 
assumed 
,000 ,07909017 ,01687988 
 
Independent Samples Test 
 
t-test for Equality of Means 
95% Confidence Interval of the 
Difference 
Lower Upper 
CAR_MA
M 
Equal variances assumed ,04173079 ,11644954 
Equal variances not 
assumed 
,04422345 ,11395688 
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Appendix D6 - SPSS outputs from the tests of comparison of CAR mean: ERROR 
negative and CAR measured by market adjusted model 
Tests of compare quarterly abnormal returns means using market adjusted model, in paths with negative 
earnings forecast error. 
T-Test 
Group Statistics 
 SURP N Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error Mean 
CAR_MA
M 
>= ,00000 47 ,0319780 ,05107140 ,00744953 
< ,00000 179 -,0439032 ,04833976 ,00361308 
 
 
Independent Samples Test 
 
Levene's Test for Equality of 
Variances t-test for Equality of Means 
F Sig. t df 
CAR_MA
M 
Equal variances assumed ,007 ,932 9,465 224 
Equal variances not 
assumed   
9,165 69,197 
 
Independent Samples Test 
 
t-test for Equality of Means 
Sig. (2-tailed) 
Mean 
Difference 
Std. Error 
Difference 
CAR_MA
M 
Equal variances assumed ,000 ,07588120 ,00801686 
Equal variances not 
assumed 
,000 ,07588120 ,00827948 
 
Independent Samples Test 
 
t-test for Equality of Means 
95% Confidence Interval of the 
Difference 
Lower Upper 
CAR_MA
M 
Equal variances assumed ,06008308 ,09167932 
Equal variances not 
assumed 
,05936493 ,09239748 
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Appendix E - SPSS outputs - Proportions tests 
Appendix E1 – SPSS outputs: proportions tests (Hypothesis 2) 
Crosstabs 
surp_negativo & erro_negativo 
surp_negativo erro_negativo 
,00 1,00 
dimension0 
,00 48 315 
1,00 235 38 
 
Test Statisticsb 
 surp_negativo & erro_negativo 
N 636 
Chi-squarea 11,082 
Asymp. Sig. ,001 
Exact Sig. (2-tailed) ,001 
Exact Sig. (1-tailed) ,000 
Point Probability ,000 
a. Continuity Corrected 
b. McNemar Test 
Appendix E2 - SPSS outputs: proportions tests (Hypothesis 3) 
error_neg_surp_zero_pos & error_pos_zero_surp_neg 
error_neg_surp_zero_pos error_pos_zero_surp_neg 
,00 1,00 
dimension0 
,00 550 38 
1,00 48 0 
Test Statisticsb 
 error_neg_surp_zero_pos & error_pos_zero_surp_neg 
N 636 
Chi-squarea ,942 
Asymp. Sig. ,332 
Exact Sig. (2-tailed) ,332 
Exact Sig. (1-tailed) ,166 
Point Probability ,048 
a. Continuity Corrected 
b. McNemar Test 
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Appendix F - Results from the tests of hypothesis 4 – 
Full sample 
Apendix F1 – Results from regression (9) using full sample: CAR measured by 
OLS market model 
Estimation results of regression (9) using CAR measured with OLS market model. 
Table 31 – Association between the premium to MBE and expectations management: results from the 
estimation of regression (9) using CAR measured by OLS market model – Full sample 
(t-statistics provided in parenthesis) 
itit
subset
it
it
subset
ititititit
SURPDMBE
SURPDMBEDMBEDMBESURPERRORCAR
εδ
δδδδδδ
+
++++++=
*
*
6
543210  
Dependent Variable: CARi,t OLS Market Model 
Full sample N=632 
 
δ0 δ1 δ2 δ3 δ4 δ5 δ6 R2 
Coeficients -0,027*** 0,404 1,108* 0,060*** -0,020 -0,051 3.891 
20,29% 
t-statistc (-4,081) (0,723) (1,829) (6,623) (-1,045) (-0,084) (1,204) 
White test  Chi2 (15)=37,7988 Prob>Chi2=0,0010 
Breusch-Pagan  Chi2 (1)=0,15982  Prob>Chi2=0,689321 
Hausman  Chi2 (5)=3,25696 Prob>Chi2=0,775973 
Test F  F (45, 580)  =  0,91406   Prob > F =  0,5784 
 Heterocedasticity Adjusted 
Coeficients -0,023*** 0,536 1,242** 0,051*** -0,010 0,792 1.965 
15,20% 
t-statistc (-3,051) (0,651) (1,120) (5,287) (-0734) (0,857) (0,880) 
CARQ is the cumulative abnormal return over the period beginning two days following the first forecast and ending 1 day 
following the end of the quarter. 
ERROR is the forecast error computed as the difference between the actual earnings and the earliest forecast for the 
quarter, EPS_FF; standardized by price at the beginning of the quarter. 
SURP is the earnings surprise computed as the difference between the actual earnings and the latest forecast for the 
quarter, EPS_LF; standardized by price at the beginning of the quarter. 
DMBE is a dummy variable that takes on the value of 1 if SURP>=0 and 0 otherwise. 
DMBEsubset is a dummy variable that takes on the value 1 if SURP>=0 and the observation belongs to the designated 
subset of the sample; otherwise DMBEsubset=0. 
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Apendix F2 - Results from regression (9) using full sample: CAR measured by 
market adjusted model 
Estimation results of regression 9 using CAR measured with market adjusted model. 
Table 32 - Association between the premium to MBE and expectations management: results from the 
estimation of regression (9) using CAR measured by market adjusted model – Full sample 
(t-statistics provided in parenthesis) 
 
itit
subset
it
it
subset
ititititit
SURPDMBE
SURPDMBEDMBEDMBESURPERRORCAR
εδ
δδδδδδ
++
+++++=
*
*
6
543210   
Dependent Variable: CARi,t Market Adjusted  Model 
Full sample N=636 
 
δ0 δ1 δ2 δ3 δ4 δ5 δ6 R2 
Coeficients -0,053*** 0,545 1,544*** 0,106*** -0,022** -0,129 0,516 
52,10% 
t-statistc (-10,899) (1,085) (2,787) (15,059) (-1,996) (-1,178) (0,167) 
White test  Chi2 (16)=34,9731 Prob>Chi2=0,0040 
Breusch-Pagan  Chi2 (1)=0,090031  Prob>Chi2=0,764138 
Hausman  Chi2 (5)=15,1183 Prob>Chi2=0,019356 
Test F  F (45, 584)  =  1,01364   Prob > F =  0,45045 
 Heterocedasticity Adjusted 
Coeficients -0,045*** 0,684 2,076** 0,095*** -0,019** -0,121* -0,263 
48,11% 
t-statistc (-9,733) (0,948) (2,458) (14,32) (-2,108) (1,737) (-0,152) 
CARQ is the cumulative abnormal return over the period beginning two days following the first forecast and ending 1 
day following the earnings release. 
ERROR is the forecast error computed as the difference between the actual earnings and the earliest forecast for the 
quarter, EPS_FF; standardized by price at the beginning of the quarter. 
SURP is the earnings surprise computed as the difference between the actual earnings and the latest forecast for the 
quarter, EPS_LF; standardized by price at the beginning of the quarter. 
DMBE is a dummy variable that takes on the value of 1 if SURP>=0 and 0 otherwise. 
DMBEsubset is a dummy variable that takes on the value 1 if SURP>=0 and the observation belongs to the designated 
subset of the sample; otherwise DMBEsubset=0. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
